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Somalia Jails Brits & Americans Over Ransom Cash June 20, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management.
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If the issue of piracy was not problematic enough, Somalia has just jailed six foreigners including three Britons and an American for bringing millions of dollars into Somalia to pay ransoms.  The Somali courts sentenced the Brit and American to 15 years in prison and a $15,000 fine for carrying $3.6 million into Somalia on charges of illegally carrying money into the country to pay the ransoms and landing in Mogadishu without the correct papers.  “We sentenced the two pilots, who are American and British nationals, to fifteen years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine each,” the Mogadishu court’s judge Hashi Elmi told Reuters late on Saturday.  As one can imagine the aircraft and cash are now the property of Somalia’s government.  This situation further highlights the challenges that shipping companies face with Somali piracy.  It is clear from this situation that the “government” of Somalia is implicitly supporting the piracy if not explicitly supporting.

According to figures from the International Maritime Bureau, pirates took a record 1,181 hostages in 2010, seizing 53 ships, all but four taken by Somali pirates. “More people were taken hostage at sea in 2010 than in any year since records began,” the organisation’s annual report said.

Analysis of “Are Weapons the Answer to Counter Ship Piracy?” Part 1 of 2 June 14, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management, weapons and tactics.
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Recently I was reading an article on Maritime Executive and a few of the comments gave me pause which, I believe, requires a response.  This post will attempt to objectively analyze the underlying issues outlined in the article.  Brevity precludes a comprehensive critique of the article so only the major identified issues will be addressed in this post

Notice that the term objectively is italicized in the first paragraph.  The first aspect of the article that raises issues is the assertion that it is ‘objective’.  As defined by Webster’s dictionary:

“a : expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations “ 

Simply saying that an article is ‘objective’ does not make it so.  It is impossible for any position paper to be ‘objective’ in that the author is attempting to make an argument to support their conclusion.

In reading the article, the author clearly has an agenda as articulated in the final sentence of the conclusion where he definitively states:

“The potential means of reducing the commercial return for pirates and of imposing considerable financial pressures on them currently exists within the power of the industry, without resort to arms.”

Furthermore, in an attempt to assuage the readers’ fears that the author is not being objective, a disclaimer is provided in which the author acknowledges “…his interest through its support to GAC Solutions in the provision of maritime security services and support to maritime clients.”

With the conclusion clearly articulated and the author’s position within the industry identified for the readers,  it is now possible to review some of the premises, which ostensibly support the conclusion.

In the background section of the article, the author editorializes while making several strong claims.  Namely he asserts that:

“..the debate (about arming ships) currently seems to be driven more by the following: fear induced pressure on the stakeholders; the questionable authority of some proponents of arming ships; frustration throughout the industry at the apparent ease with which pirates can gain access and control of ships.”

This author would suggest that “the apparent ease” of gaining access and control of ships is a legitimate concern for ship owners and does not suggest an environment of pressure born out of fear.  A disturbing aspect of the article is the imperious attitude of the author when he suggests that some proponents of arming ships are of ‘questionable authority’.   Many proponents of arming ships (this author included) have experience and education that would likely merit some level of respect of their positions.

He further states that:

“The effect of an over-dramatic media creates a perception of the frequency and impact of piracy attacks that is not borne out by statistics. Also, the argument for arming ships increasingly relies on the use of the strap line “No ship with armed escorts has been taken.” There are many equally true statements such as, “ships with particular funnel markings have not been taken””.

While this blog post is not intended to dissect the statistical aspects of the argument, when discussing risk there are two primary components; probability and impact.  While the probability of a ship being taken is, in fact small, it is suggested that the impact is anything but trivial.  In fact, yesterday it was acknowledged that pirates received a ‘double-figure million US dollar” ransom.  When evaluating the risk from an annualized loss expectancy perspective, it is suggested that arming ships does in fact, make financial sense.  The last statement related to ships being taken merits no further response as any college freshman statistics student would rightly identify that the funnel markings would be considered a spurious relationship while the armed escorts would be considered statistically relevant. To read more about risk and risk analysis please read this post.

The last section that stands out is the one titled Weapons and effects.  I was apoplectic when I read the author’s assertion that:

“Hollywood and the media have greatly exaggerated the destructive power of such weapons as the RPG7, while the AK47 has an iconic status. The RPG7 is a rocket propelled grenade, with very limited capability and effect. The AK47 is a superb close quarter battle weapon, ideal for insurgents, pirates and many others, because of its simplicity and functionality. However, it is a very inaccurate weapon, with little penetration capability. Both can, and do, create a situation of panic and fear in those with no understanding because of the noise effect and peoples unrealistic image of their capabilities”

Once again the author attempts to assert authority on the subject by demeaning readers who lack the same experience as the author.  He clearly intimates that the reason people are afraid of the RPG 7 and AK 47 is because they lack understanding of the weapons, the weapons are loud, and people have unrealistic images of their capabilities.  While certainly shows like Rambo and the A-Team portrait unrealistic capabilities of weapons, this author also has experience with such weapons and can state definitively that RPG 7’s and AK 47’s deserve respect.  To suggest otherwise is irresponsible to those who may not have the requisite experience to understand the destructive capabilities of such weapons.  More information can be found in the post titled: “Whitpaper on Weapons and Tactics”

Part 2 will continue the analysis.

Realpolitik, Piracy, and Armchair Quarterbacks April 24, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management.
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I was reading an article on CNN yesterday related to maritime piracy that struck me as interesting. It also just so happens that I have some experience with the topic of the article.

I have had the fortunate opportunity to travel and teach globally.  Anyone that has listened to me speak has heard me say: “In my opinion anyone who tells you that “All you need to do to fix problem X is to do Y…” probably does not understand much about security, risk or business.”    Within politics there is a concept known as realpolitik.  Wikipedia defines it as: “…politics or diplomacy based primarily on power and on practical and material factors and considerations, rather than ideological notions or moralistic or ethical premises.”  It is the difference between theory and practice that often creates challenges in life, politics, and anti-piracy.

The article to which I am referring was written by a very prominent person with over 24 books to his name.  While I would not think to question or debate on the nuances of political theory or economics in this case I found a statement very interesting and relevant and it highlights the differences between Realpolitik and theory very well.

The article was referring to piracy within the Gulf of Aden and specifically off of the coast of Somalia.  In the article, the author writes:

“All we need to do (emphasis added) is declare that for ships on the high sea, a 300-yard radius around the vessels is a limited access zone. Anybody closing in farther without permission will be assumed to be hostile. First, warning shots will be fired across their bow; if this will not do, shoot to kill.

True, this means that merchant ships will need some armed marshals, as do many flights. However, given that the ships are tall and the pirates need to mount them from their small boats, a few armed guards can do the job.”

Here is where theory and practice diverge and armchair quarterbacking takes over.  It is easy to be an armchair quarterback (or in this case ship’s crew) when it is not your own very expensive ship on the line or your own life on the line when the RPGs start flying. I can say from personal experience that it is less fun  being shot at in real life than the movies may suggest.  Additionally, the article ignores the much larger socio-political aspects of piracy.

To understand the feasibilityof what the author suggested let’s dissect what he is saying a little more closely.  He states that a 300 yard radius should be imposed around the ships.

In Somalia pirates are attacking ships using small skiffs that often travel over 40 knots (~46 mph).  Their skiffs are small, lightweight and agile.  The pirates attack ships using multiple boats and primarily carrying RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades, PKM machine guns, and AK-47 assault rifles.  They have little fear and are very aggressive.  In short, these guys are armed to the teeth and very capable.

On a 30ft x 8ft target moving at 9 mph the US Army gives the RPG 7 a hit probability of 22% at 300 meters, 51% at 200 meters, and 96% at 100 meters.  If one considers that the bridge or rudder of ship is the target and doubles the size of the target listed in the Army study, it is fair to say the hit probability doubles, as well.  This means that at 300 meters, the pirates have a 50/50 chance of hitting the bridge or rudder and doing serious damage to the ship.   If a pirate gets within 200 meters of the ship, their chance of a hit increases statistically to 100%.  The answer, according to the author, is to “…fire warning shots across their bow; if this will not do, shoot to kill.”- If they get within 300 meters.   The author then goes on to say that: “a few armed guards can do the job.” 

As a former Marine sniper with combat experience,  I would consider myself competent with a number of different weapons systems.  I also have experience guarding ships in Somalia.  I can say with absolute confidence that firing: “…warning shots across their bow..” and then: “…shoot(ing) to kill…” at a moving target on the open ocean 300 meters away is a lot easier for action stars like Matt Damon or Sylvester Stallone in thier movies than it is for real people in real situations.  In fact, what the author is proposing is very difficult.  To demonstrate some of the challenges, let us take a quick look at what is involved.

Consider that you are on a ship which is travelling 10 knots (creating a wind that affects the shot that this article will not address).  Consider that you now also have to keep your sights on a very small skiff travelling at 50 knots at 300 meters all while the ship and the boats are bouncing on the ocean swells. Assuming the skiff is traveling parallel with your own boat its relative speed is 40 knots.   At 40 knots, the skiff is travelling at almost 67.5 feet per second or the length of a football field every 4.4 seconds.  This means that with a .300 Winchester  Magnum  round travelling 3050 feet per second, a shooter would need to lead the boat 24.25 feet on a stable platform to account for the speed of the boat and the .36 seconds it takes the bullet to traverse the 300 meters (accounting for decease in velocity for you math geniuses).  This basic calculation does not account for the vertical movement of the ship or boat or the relative movement between the ship and the boat nor does it account for any wind that may be present.  Assuming your target is a person and is 1.2 feet across it is in the ‘hit zone’ for only .013 of a second when travelling at 40 knots.  This means that your lead ‘cushion’ is only .9 feet or 10.8 inches.   In short, if you lead more 25.04 feet or less than 23.36 feet, you have missed your target completely.  If your lead is perfect and you have miscalculated the distance of your target by only 10 meters, you have also missed your target.

Suffice it to say that shooting at a small, high speed target while on a moving platform is more than difficult.  It is extremely difficult.   Couple this with the fact that the pirates are masquerading as fishermen and you have compounded the issue because nobody wants to make a mistake and hurt an innocent person.  In short, the last action any ship’s captain (or security personnel) wants to take is to get into a shootout with pirates that are carrying big guns that can do a lot of damage.  Once the shooting starts, things can turn badly in short order.  The best answer is (to quote Monte Python when they are being attacked by the rabbit)...”Run away..run away…”  A show of force and situational awareness will often dissuade the pirates from attacking you.  There is no shame in outrunning the pirates with the ship without firing a single shot and everyone on it safe and sound.  Discretion is the better part of valor 99% of the time.

When it becomes necessary to respond to fire or otherwise engage the pirates to protect the ship or her crew, discipline, and experience are critical.  As can be seen in the post, engaging moving targets from a moving platform is difficult and requires specialized skills and training.

Risk 101: An Introduction To Risk April 24, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Risk & Risk Management.
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Risk is inherent in everything people do in life and risk analysis is employed by people every day to make the many decisions.  While many may not realize it, risk analysis is employed by people in making even the most seemingly simple decisions: “Should I bring an umbrella?” or “I don’t think I’ll park my car in this unlit parking lot.”  To understand how these simple questions apply a rather complex analysis, it is important to understand the essential components of risk.

In the most basic sense, Risk can be defined as “…the potential negative impact to some characteristic of value that may arise from a future event, or we can say that “Risks are events or conditions that may occur, and whose occurrence, if it does take place, has a harmful or negative effect.” 

Risk is commonly described as the probability or likelihood of a known loss.  For our purposes, we will define Risk as a function of the following:

The likelihood of an Event occurring and the resulting Impact should the event occur.

Understanding risk and how it applies is critical to minimizing exposure to events and to enabling effective, efficient risk management techniques. While the term ‘risk’ is used frequently within many industries, it is often used erroneously.

Consider the following example. On any given day there is a possibility that a meteorite will crash into a house, likely resulting in the total destruction of the house. While the impact would be a total loss of the house, the likelihood of the event occurring is, we hope, infinitesimally small.

Contrast that with the possibility that the same house could catch fire from an electrical malfunction or other issue. While most home fires do not result in a total loss of the house and the likelihood of the house being completely destroyed is less than if it were hit by a meteor, the probability of the event occurring is much greater. This is why fire insurance is a sound investment and meteor insurance is most likely not.

Many risk models attempt to quantify risk by using monetary values to represent the impact of an event and use a probability of an event occurring during a given year to represent the likelihood.

A basic method of quantifying risk in information security is to multiply the likelihood of an event occurring in a given year (expressed as a probability) by the expected impact (in dollars) should the event be realized.  The calculation can thus be expressed as:

( % of Event A occurring) X ($ Impact should Event A be realized) = Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE)

Applying this model assume there is a 5% probability that an event will occur in a given year and the estimated damage will be $10,000. In this scenario the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) is calculated at $500 per year (5% x $10,000). This is the basic premise, though certainly there are much more advanced actuarial data and more sophisticated models on which insurance premiums are based. In a perfect world, actuarial and other information would be available to allow people to evaluate Risk with a great degree of accuracy.  In the world in which we live, it is rarely quite that simple.

Identifying the potential events and estimating their likelihood and expected loss is difficult.  These concepts will be covered in later blog posts.