The Misleading Nature of Military Death Rates May 26, 2026
Posted by Chris Mark in Uncategorized, War, weapons and tactics.Tags: Band of Brothers, Eighth Air Force, History, MACV-SOG, Military History, politics, Risk Analysis, statistics, Submarine Warfare, vietnam, Vietnam War, War, WWII
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Someone on Memorial day posted on social media that submariners suffered the highest death rate of any American service in World War II. As a comat veteran who holds Memorial Day as a somber occasion it caused me to pause and think. While the raw stats suggest that the statement is true, is also very nearly meaningless as a statement about danger — and understanding why is one of the most useful lessons in how a single, accurate number can completely mislead you.
The American submarine force was small. Roughly 16,000 men made war patrols, and about 3,500 of them never came home, with 52 boats lost. That works out to a fatality rate near 22 percent — the highest of any U.S. branch. Historian Donald Miller, in Masters of the Air, makes the point bluntly: of all the branches of the American armed forces, only submarine crews had a higher fatality rate than his bomber boys, at almost 23 percent.
Now set that against the Eighth Air Force, which lost about 26,000 men killed — more fatalities than the entire United States Marine Corps. In raw numbers, the bomber campaign looks far deadlier than the silent service. Both pictures are accurate. They simply measure different things, and neither one, by itself, tells you how dangerous it was to actually do the job.
Rate Versus Count
The first trap is confusing a rate with a count. “Highest death rate” is a proportion: deaths divided by everyone who held the role. “Most deaths” is a raw tally. A small, lethal specialty can top the rate chart while contributing a tiny share of total deaths, simply because its denominator is small. That is exactly the submarine service — a few thousand deaths out of a few thousand men produces a brutal percentage.
The bomber force generates the opposite illusion. The 26,000 dead is a frightening number, but 350,000 men served in the Eighth Air Force, and most of them were ground crew and support staff who were never in danger. Measured against the 210,000 who actually flew combat, the death rate was about 12.4 percent. Measured against everyone in uniform, it falls to around 7 percent. The raw body count reflects the size of the force, not the danger of the seat.
So once we strip out the size disparity and compare combat men to combat men, the submariner — at roughly 22 to 23 percent — was in the statistically deadlier billet, and the bomber crews, at about 12 percent, come second. If a death rate were the same thing as danger, we could stop here.
It isn’t.
Danger Lives in the Exposure, Not the Total
A death rate is a cumulative number — the odds you eventually died, summed over your entire time in the role. What it conceals is the variable that actually defines danger: how much risk you absorbed per unit of exposure, and how much exposure you were forced to take. Epidemiologists separate these as cumulative incidence (did you die at all) versus the hazard rate (how lethal each moment was). War tells the same story.
A bomber crew’s exposure was tightly capped. A tour was 25 missions early in the war, later raised to 30 and then 35. Each mission ran about six to nine hours; the famous Memphis Belle logged 148 hours across her 25 missions, under six hours apiece. Complete the longest tour and you had spent, at most, around 245 hours in the air — roughly ten days of cumulative flying. That cap is the entire reason the cumulative death rate looks “only” moderate. Per hour aloft, the danger was savage. In the brutal 1942–43 period, of the men who flew the original 25-mission tour, only about a third survived it; by October 1943, fewer than one in four crewmen could realistically expect to finish. The job didn’t become survivable until escort fighters won air superiority — by 1945, 81 percent completed a full 35-mission tour.
A submariner, by contrast, accumulated his 22 percent over an enormous span of time. A single war patrol lasted six to eight weeks — a thousand hours or more continuously inside the kill zone — and most men made several. So while the submariner’s lifetime odds were worse, the bomber crewman faced a far higher chance of death per hour of combat, by something on the order of five to ten times. The two jobs were lethal in opposite shapes: the submarine was a long, grinding exposure; the bomber was a short, concentrated burst of extreme danger, repeated until your luck or the war ran out.
This is the heart of the matter. A short tour with a horrific per-mission hazard and a long tour with a milder per-hour hazard can land on the very same headline death rate. The number hides which one you were.

Figure 1. Approximate death rate per hour of combat exposure. The submarine held the worse lifetime odds, but a bomber crewman faced roughly eight times the risk per hour in the air.
MACV-SOG: The Law of Small Numbers at Its Deadliest
If you want the purest illustration of how exposure and small denominators distort a death rate, look at the most dangerous billet of the modern era: the covert reconnaissance teams of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG).
During the Vietnam war SOG teams ran cross-border missions into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam in tiny “spike teams” — typically two or three Americans led by a “One-Zero” plus a handful of indigenous troops. Its recon men posted a casualty rate that exceeded 100 percent, described as the highest sustained American loss rate since the Civil War. In 1968, every SOG recon man was wounded at least once, and about half were killed.
Two statistical points make SOG essential to this discussion. First, the denominator was minuscule — of roughly 2,000 men who served in SOG, only about 400 to 600 actually ran recon and direct-action missions. This is the law of small numbers: tiny populations produce extreme, volatile rates that large forces never show. A rate above 100 percent is impossible for a big army and routine for a few hundred men hit repeatedly. Second, that 100-plus percent is a casualty rate — killed plus wounded — and it tops 100 only because individual men were wounded multiple times. Apply the same discipline we used on the bombers and the death rate among recon men sits closer to half in the worst years. The categories matter, and conflating “casualty” with “killed” is how the number gets abused.
SOG also fits the bomber pattern in a way worth naming: it was all-volunteer, and its danger was delivered in a relatively small number of discrete missions, each lasting only days, rather than spread thin across a long deployment. The lethality was per-mission, and per-mission it was off the charts. (The flip side of that intensity: SOG recorded a kill ratio of 158 to 1 in 1970, the highest in U.S. military history.)
Easy Company: When Replacements Hide the Body Count
The final distortion is the one most people miss, and the Band of Brothers company illustrates it perfectly. E Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, jumped into Normandy, Holland, and Bastogne. It was formed at Camp Toccoa with about 140 men. By the end of the war, 366 men had served in its ranks, and 49 were killed in action.
Run the naive math and you get a death rate around 13 percent — comparable to bomber aircrew, and apparently far less dangerous than the submarine service. That number is a lie of the denominator. The company’s standing strength was only about 140, yet 366 men cycled through it. Easy was effectively destroyed and rebuilt more than twice over. It jumped into Market Garden with 154 men and came out with 98; it had already taken 65 casualties in Normandy. Counted against the men who were actually present at any given moment, the company suffered well over 100 percent casualties. The 13 percent figure is diluted because the denominator kept refilling with fresh replacements who hadn’t yet been hit.
Notice, too, that almost no Easy Company men became prisoners — like the submariners, their losses converted into killed and wounded rather than capture. A downed bomber crewman could parachute and survive as a POW; an infantryman in a Bastogne foxhole or a submariner in a sinking boat had no such exit. The shape of the casualties is as informative as the count.
So How Do You Actually Measure Danger?
A headline death rate flattens at least three distinct things into one misleading figure: the intensity of each exposure (per mission, per hour), the duration of exposure (how long, how many times you went out), and the denominator (small units and replacement churn that warp the percentage). The submarine looks worst by lifetime odds. The bomber looks worst per hour of combat. SOG looks worst per mission and shows how small numbers break the scale entirely. Easy Company shows how a steady stream of replacements can bury the true cost inside a tame-looking percentage.

Figure 2. The four headline death rates as commonly cited. Each is measured on a different basis — a peak year versus the whole war, a small recon subset versus everyone who served, and a figure diluted by constant replacements. Lined up as equals, they invite exactly the false conclusions this article warns against.
The honest question was never “what fraction of them died.” It is “how likely was a man to die each time he went out, and how many times was he made to go.” Answer those two, and the statistic finally tells the truth. Quote only the first number, and you can prove almost anything — including that the deadliest jobs of the war weren’t very dangerous at all. On Memorial day, remember those who gave all for our freedoms. Whether they were killed in combat or died in training. They all served and died for us.
References
- Miller, Donald L. Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany. Simon & Schuster, 2006. (Eighth Air Force fatalities; submarine fatality comparison; tour-completion statistics.)
- 398th Bomb Group Memorial Association, “One in Twenty — The 398th’s Killed in Action.” (12.38 percent mortality among 210,000 combat aircrew; tour-survival rates by year.) https://www.398th.org/History/KIA/index.html
- Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Wound Ballistics in World War II, Chapter 9 — Eighth Air Force battle-casualty survey. (MIA resolution: roughly 40 percent killed, 60 percent survived as POW, wounded, or evaders.) https://achh.army.mil/history/book-wwii-woundblstcs-chapter9/
- Plaster, John L. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster, 1997. (Recon casualty rates; team structure; cross-border operations.)
- HistoryNet, “How Top-Secret Commando Unit SOG Took on the Most Dangerous Missions in Vietnam.” (Casualty rate exceeding 100 percent; 1968 figures; 158-to-1 kill ratio.) https://www.historynet.com/studies-and-observations-group-vietnam/
- The National Interest, “Inside the Daring Missions of MACV-SOG.” (Approximately 2,000 served in SOG; 400–600 ran recon and direct action.)
- Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest. Simon & Schuster, 1992. (Market Garden strength figures; Normandy and Bastogne casualties.)
- TogetherWeServed, “Famous Army Unit: Easy Company, 506th Infantry Regiment.” (140 original members; 366 total served; 49 killed in action.)
Note: Figures for elite and small units, especially SOG, are frequently dramatized. Where casualty rates exceed 100 percent, that figure reflects killed plus wounded (with multiple woundings per man), not a death rate. Comparisons above use matched combat populations wherever possible.
超限战 – “Warfare without Bounds”; China’s Hacking of the US February 24, 2020
Posted by Chris Mark in cyberespionage, cybersecurity, Politics, weapons and tactics.Tags: AT&T, china, Chris Mark, cybercrime, espionage, hacking, PLA, Unlimited, Unrestricted, Warfare
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“Pleased to meet you…hope you guessed my name…But what’s puzzling you is the nature of my game.”
– The Rolling Stones; Sympathy for the Devil
UPDATE: On Feb 10, 2020 The US Government charged 4 Chinese Military Officers with hacking in the 2017 Equifax breach. On January 28th, the FBI arrested a Harvard professor of lying about ties to a Chinese recruitment effort and receiving payment from the US Government. The attacks, subterfuge and efforts continue against the US. Why? Read the original post form 2016 and learn about Unlimited Warfare.
Original post from 2016: More recently, the With the recent US Government’s acknowledgement of China’s hacking of numerous government websites and networks, many are likely wondering why China would have an interest in stealing employee data? To answer this question, we need to look back at the 1991 Gulf War. You can read my 2013 Article (WorldCyberwar) in the Counter Terrorist Magazine on this subject.
In 1991, a coalition led by the United States invaded Iraq in defense of Kuwait. At the time Iraq had the 5th largest standing army in the world. The US led coalition defeated the Iraqi army in resounding fashion in only 96 hours. For those in the United States the victory was impressive but the average American civilian did not have an appreciation for how this victory was accomplished.
The Gulf War was the first real use of what is known as C4I. In short, C4I is an acronym for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. The Gulf War was the first use of a new technology known as Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The Battle of Medina Ridge was a decisive tank battle in Iraq fought on February 26, 1991 and the first to use GPS. In this 40 minute battle, the US 1st Armored Division fought the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Republican Guard and won decisively. While the US lost 4 tanks and had 2 people killed, the Iraqis suffered a loss of 186 tanks, 127 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 839 soldiers captured. The Chinese watched the Gulf War closely and came away with an understanding that a conventional ‘linear’ war against the United States was unwinnable.
After the Gulf War the Chinese People’s Liberation Army tasked two PLA colonels (Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui) with redefining the concept of warfare. From this effort came a new model of Warfare that is published in the book “Unrestricted Warfare” or “Warfare without Bounds”. Unrestricted Warfare is just what it sound like. The idea that ‘pseudo-wars’ can be fought against an enemy. Information warfare, PR efforts and other tactics are used to undermine and enemy without engaging in kinetic, linear battle. Below is a quote from the book:
“If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means including armed force and non-armed force, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”
“As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.”
It further stated: “… a single rumor or scandal that results in fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates…can be included in the ranks of new concept weapons.”
On April 15, 2011, the US Congressional Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted a hearing on Chinese cyber-espionage. The hearing revealed the US government’s awareness of Chinese cyberattacks. In describing the situation in his opening remarks, subcommittee chairperman Dana Rohrbacher* astutely stated:
“[The]United States is under attack.”
“The Communist Chinese Government has defined us as the enemy. It is buying, building and stealing whatever it takes to contain and destroy us. Again, the Chinese Government has defined us as the enemy.”
Given the Chinese perspective on Unlimited Warfare, it becomes much more clear that what we are seeing with the compromises are examples of ‘pseudo wars’ being fought by the Chinese. It will be interesting to see how or if the US responds.
*thank you to the reader who corrected my referencing Mr. Rohrbacher as a female. My apologies to Chairman Rohrbacher!
Asymmetric Warfare 101 July 21, 2015
Posted by Chris Mark in Risk & Risk Management, weapons and tactics.Tags: asymmetric threats, asymmetric warfare, Chris Mark, guerrilla warfare, mark consulting group, risk management, security
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With the current state of affairs I thought it appropriate to ‘republish’ this blog post from 2012. You can also read the article from Secure Payments Magazine on the same topic applied to InfoSec.
Asymmetric Warfare can be described as the strategy of using weapons, tactics, and methods to render the asymmetry that exists between two adversaries as moot. Consider the US Military for a moment. Since the end of World War II, which is arguably the start of US hegemony, the United States has fielded what many believe is the most powerful conventional military in the history of the world (or at least modern world). In spite, of this fact the US, and her allies) have struggled in conflicts in Vietnam, Somalia, and most recently in Iraq, and Afghanistan. In each of these theaters it was groups of lesser-trained, relatively ill-equipped insurgents that created significant challenges to the US military. By applying guerilla tactics, and employing IEDs and other technologies, the adversaries were able to balance the perceived asymmetry between the might of the US and their own capabilities.
The US is not alone in this dubious distinction of struggling with conventionally weaker adversaries. The Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and a much weaker France, led by Napoleon, defeated the powerful Prussian Military. France, in turn, lost French Indochina with the coup-de-grace coming in the surrender at Dien Bein Phu in 1954. If each of these countries were militarily superior to their foes, how did they end up losing their respective wars? These examples outline the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare.
While there exist a number of different definitions of Asymmetric Warfare, in a basic sense it applies to the strategies and tactics employed by a militarily weaker opponent to take advantage of vulnerabilities in the stronger opponent. As an example, few military forces on the planet would face the US military and her allies in open combat either on land or the sea. Doing so would be certain suicide. A look at the Persian Gulf War in 1991 shows the result of taking on the military might of the Western World in open combat. The Battle of Medina Ridge is a prime example. In this battle between the US 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division against the Iraqi, 2nd Brigade of 2nd Medina Luminous Division the US recorded 1 killed, and 30 wounded while recording 4 tanks as being damaged. The Iraqis, meanwhile, reported “heavy manpower losses” while reporting 186 tanks destroyed and 127 Armored Fighting Vehicles destroyed.
If a militarily inferior opponent cannot face the US, or Western powers in open combat, how do they fight? It is fair to day the days of Mahanian sea battles are behind us. Quite simply, they employ strategies that render the superior military might irrelevant or at least less relevant. Guerilla warfare is an example of an asymmetric strategy against a militarily superior foe. As stated in the military classic “On Guerrilla Warfare” by Mao Tse-Tung:
“At one end of the spectrum, ranks of electronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily spew out endless tapes. Scientists and engineers confer in air conditioned offices; missiles are checked by intense men who move about them silently, almost reverently….in forty minutes the countdown begins.
At the other end of the spectrum, a tired man wearing a greasy felt hat, a tattered shirt, and soiled shorts is seated, his back against a tree. Barrel pressed between his knees, butt resting on the moist earth between his sandaled feet, is a browning automatic rifle. ..Draped around his neck, a sausage-like cloth tube with three day’s supply of rice…In forty minutes his group of fifteen men will occupy a previously prepared ambush.”
This is warfare today. Unfortunately, the US, and her allies have learned that technology alone cannot win a war against a determined, creative enemy.
As discussed earlier the concept of Asymmetric Warfare is a field of some debate. When applying the concept to the business, and specifically the Information Security arena, it is more appropriate to apply the concept of Asymmetric Threats posited by C.A. Primmerman. Without going through too much of the math, and modifying Primmerman’s original theory, we can state that a threat can be expressed using the following two statements:
- Adversary A could & would attack Adversary B by doing X
- Adversary B could & would respond to Adversary A by doing X.
Now we have the simple conclusion that statement (1) represents an asymmetric action if statement (2) is false, and it represents a symmetric action if statement (2) is true.
As an example of this concept working in practice, consider the following:
1a. Adversary A would attack Adversary B by using terror tactics against the civilian population.
2a. Adversary B would respond to Adversary A by terror tactics against the civilian population.
If statement 2a is false then the threat in 1a is asymmetric.
According to Pimmerman, an Asymmetric Threat must meet three criteria. These have been modified for our purposes and include:
- It must involve a weapon, tactic or strategy that the adversary both could and would use against another adversary.
- It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that the would not or could not be be employed by one adversary.
- It must involve a weapon, tactic, or strategy that, if not countered, could have serious consequences. If a threat meets these three criteria, it would be considered asymmetric.
As any student of military strategy can attest, being in a purely defensive mode is a losing proposition. Unfortunately, in many instances asymmetric threats place one adversary in an almost purely defensive position. One of my favorite quotes that appears appropriately relevant now is by Julius Ceasar:
“There is no fate worse than being continuously under guard, for it means you are always afraid.”
While not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of Asymmetric Threats the basic concepts are relevant in today’s world.
“The UN, Guns, and US Constitution” – Explaning the Arms Trade Treaty July 27, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Laws and Leglslation, Politics, terrorism, weapons and tactics.Tags: 2nd amendment, arms trade treaty, Constitution, guns, mark consulting group, NRA, ownership, senate, UN
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Recent events in the US have once again ignited the debate over control of guns within the US. This post is not a political debate rather an introduction to US gun issues and, more specifically, actions of the United Nations. First, for some quick statistics. According to the US Firearms Institute between 40% – 50% of US homes own firearms. There are between 250 million and 280 million firearms in the US owned by between 120 million and 150 million US citizens. Hunting, shooting, and firearms are deeply embedded in the US culture and history. In fact, the right to own firearms is guaranteed in the US Constitution’s 2nd Amendment which states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” As every 6th grader knows, the 2nd Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights which was passed in 1791. While many people don’t agree with the 2nd Amendment the US Supreme Court has upheld the amendment and clarified the intent in several cases: (more…)
Long Range Shooting with Lloyd Hill – Long Range Shooting Shop June 27, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in weapons and tactics.Tags: huskemaw, Lloyd Hill, long range shooting, maxaccuracy.com, MOA, Rifles, Scout Sniper, shooting, sniper
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I rarely, if ever, endorse products on this blog. A few months ago I had a chance to meet Lloyd Hill of Long Range Shooting Shop (Plano, Tx) at a range outside of Dallas when I was doing some shooting for charity. He also has a blog at www.MaxAccuracy.com. I also had a chance to shoot one of his custom 7mm Remington Mags…if you are in the market for long range shooting instruction or custom long range rifles…Lloyd is the person to speak with. As a former Marine Scout/Sniper, I am not easily impressed on the range. Lloyd impressed the hell out of me. Not only does he understand long range shooting, but he practices what he preaches. (he is a nice guy, as well with some great stories:) He spent years “overseas” and is an avid hunter. This guy does not build “Brandy Gun” (an overly expensive gun that the owner cannot shoot…he only pulls it out to show is other rich friends when they are drinking brandy from a snifter). Lloyd builds custom, long range rifles. As a testament to his skill in making a rifle, I put two rounds in less than 2 inches at 500 yards with the 7mm. For you shooting enthusiasts that is less than 1/2 MOA at 500 yards…on a rifle I had never shot. Here is a video of Lloyd.
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