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Analysis of “Are Weapons the Answer to Counter Ship Piracy?” Part 1 of 2 June 14, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management, weapons and tactics.
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Recently I was reading an article on Maritime Executive and a few of the comments gave me pause which, I believe, requires a response.  This post will attempt to objectively analyze the underlying issues outlined in the article.  Brevity precludes a comprehensive critique of the article so only the major identified issues will be addressed in this post

Notice that the term objectively is italicized in the first paragraph.  The first aspect of the article that raises issues is the assertion that it is ‘objective’.  As defined by Webster’s dictionary:

“a : expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations “ 

Simply saying that an article is ‘objective’ does not make it so.  It is impossible for any position paper to be ‘objective’ in that the author is attempting to make an argument to support their conclusion.

In reading the article, the author clearly has an agenda as articulated in the final sentence of the conclusion where he definitively states:

“The potential means of reducing the commercial return for pirates and of imposing considerable financial pressures on them currently exists within the power of the industry, without resort to arms.”

Furthermore, in an attempt to assuage the readers’ fears that the author is not being objective, a disclaimer is provided in which the author acknowledges “…his interest through its support to GAC Solutions in the provision of maritime security services and support to maritime clients.”

With the conclusion clearly articulated and the author’s position within the industry identified for the readers,  it is now possible to review some of the premises, which ostensibly support the conclusion.

In the background section of the article, the author editorializes while making several strong claims.  Namely he asserts that:

“..the debate (about arming ships) currently seems to be driven more by the following: fear induced pressure on the stakeholders; the questionable authority of some proponents of arming ships; frustration throughout the industry at the apparent ease with which pirates can gain access and control of ships.”

This author would suggest that “the apparent ease” of gaining access and control of ships is a legitimate concern for ship owners and does not suggest an environment of pressure born out of fear.  A disturbing aspect of the article is the imperious attitude of the author when he suggests that some proponents of arming ships are of ‘questionable authority’.   Many proponents of arming ships (this author included) have experience and education that would likely merit some level of respect of their positions.

He further states that:

“The effect of an over-dramatic media creates a perception of the frequency and impact of piracy attacks that is not borne out by statistics. Also, the argument for arming ships increasingly relies on the use of the strap line “No ship with armed escorts has been taken.” There are many equally true statements such as, “ships with particular funnel markings have not been taken””.

While this blog post is not intended to dissect the statistical aspects of the argument, when discussing risk there are two primary components; probability and impact.  While the probability of a ship being taken is, in fact small, it is suggested that the impact is anything but trivial.  In fact, yesterday it was acknowledged that pirates received a ‘double-figure million US dollar” ransom.  When evaluating the risk from an annualized loss expectancy perspective, it is suggested that arming ships does in fact, make financial sense.  The last statement related to ships being taken merits no further response as any college freshman statistics student would rightly identify that the funnel markings would be considered a spurious relationship while the armed escorts would be considered statistically relevant. To read more about risk and risk analysis please read this post.

The last section that stands out is the one titled Weapons and effects.  I was apoplectic when I read the author’s assertion that:

“Hollywood and the media have greatly exaggerated the destructive power of such weapons as the RPG7, while the AK47 has an iconic status. The RPG7 is a rocket propelled grenade, with very limited capability and effect. The AK47 is a superb close quarter battle weapon, ideal for insurgents, pirates and many others, because of its simplicity and functionality. However, it is a very inaccurate weapon, with little penetration capability. Both can, and do, create a situation of panic and fear in those with no understanding because of the noise effect and peoples unrealistic image of their capabilities”

Once again the author attempts to assert authority on the subject by demeaning readers who lack the same experience as the author.  He clearly intimates that the reason people are afraid of the RPG 7 and AK 47 is because they lack understanding of the weapons, the weapons are loud, and people have unrealistic images of their capabilities.  While certainly shows like Rambo and the A-Team portrait unrealistic capabilities of weapons, this author also has experience with such weapons and can state definitively that RPG 7’s and AK 47’s deserve respect.  To suggest otherwise is irresponsible to those who may not have the requisite experience to understand the destructive capabilities of such weapons.  More information can be found in the post titled: “Whitpaper on Weapons and Tactics”

Part 2 will continue the analysis.

Risk 101: An Introduction To Risk April 24, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Risk & Risk Management.
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Risk is inherent in everything people do in life and risk analysis is employed by people every day to make the many decisions.  While many may not realize it, risk analysis is employed by people in making even the most seemingly simple decisions: “Should I bring an umbrella?” or “I don’t think I’ll park my car in this unlit parking lot.”  To understand how these simple questions apply a rather complex analysis, it is important to understand the essential components of risk.

In the most basic sense, Risk can be defined as “…the potential negative impact to some characteristic of value that may arise from a future event, or we can say that “Risks are events or conditions that may occur, and whose occurrence, if it does take place, has a harmful or negative effect.” 

Risk is commonly described as the probability or likelihood of a known loss.  For our purposes, we will define Risk as a function of the following:

The likelihood of an Event occurring and the resulting Impact should the event occur.

Understanding risk and how it applies is critical to minimizing exposure to events and to enabling effective, efficient risk management techniques. While the term ‘risk’ is used frequently within many industries, it is often used erroneously.

Consider the following example. On any given day there is a possibility that a meteorite will crash into a house, likely resulting in the total destruction of the house. While the impact would be a total loss of the house, the likelihood of the event occurring is, we hope, infinitesimally small.

Contrast that with the possibility that the same house could catch fire from an electrical malfunction or other issue. While most home fires do not result in a total loss of the house and the likelihood of the house being completely destroyed is less than if it were hit by a meteor, the probability of the event occurring is much greater. This is why fire insurance is a sound investment and meteor insurance is most likely not.

Many risk models attempt to quantify risk by using monetary values to represent the impact of an event and use a probability of an event occurring during a given year to represent the likelihood.

A basic method of quantifying risk in information security is to multiply the likelihood of an event occurring in a given year (expressed as a probability) by the expected impact (in dollars) should the event be realized.  The calculation can thus be expressed as:

( % of Event A occurring) X ($ Impact should Event A be realized) = Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE)

Applying this model assume there is a 5% probability that an event will occur in a given year and the estimated damage will be $10,000. In this scenario the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) is calculated at $500 per year (5% x $10,000). This is the basic premise, though certainly there are much more advanced actuarial data and more sophisticated models on which insurance premiums are based. In a perfect world, actuarial and other information would be available to allow people to evaluate Risk with a great degree of accuracy.  In the world in which we live, it is rarely quite that simple.

Identifying the potential events and estimating their likelihood and expected loss is difficult.  These concepts will be covered in later blog posts.

Piracy and Failed States April 18, 2011

Posted by Heather Mark in Failed States, Piracy & Maritime Security.
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Governments that are unable to enforce laws within their own boundaries or project and protect their interests outside of their geographical limits are largely considered to be failed state.  The Fund for Peace studies 12 specific characteristics of failed state in their annual Failed States Index.   This serves as a very comprehensive analysis of what causes states to fail.  However, for the purposes of analyzing the genesis, spread and growth of modern-day piracy, the inability of a state to project force will serve as the definition.

The ability to project force is an essential characteristic of a functioning state. Not only does this enable states to maintain order within their domestic boundaries, it serves notice on those outside of the country’s borders that the state can and will protect their interests abroad – whether that means in the diplomatic community or in international waters.  When governments lose the ability to protect their interests, it ceases to be a legitimate government.  Its citizens no longer depend on the state for protection and its enemies (in this case pirates) begin to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the failed state structures.

The Gulf of Aden provides an ample illustration of how failing and failed states have allowed piracy to take root and flourish.  Somalia is a failed state.  In fact, it ranks at number one on the Failed States Index.  Its governmental organs are non-existent.  There is no recognized law, nor is there any means to enforce that law if it did exist.  Somali pirates often claim to be members of the Somali Navy or Coast Guard enforcing fishing rights in the region.  Since  no actual Somali Navy or Coast Guard exists, there is no one to prevent such acts from occurring.  One might suggest then that regional collective security arrangements might be beneficial in taking on the problem of piracy.  An examination of the surrounding states, however, once demonstrates why collective security arrangements would fail.

Djibouti, Somalia’s neighbor to the north, is considered a “failing” state.  Yemen, the state directly across the Gulf of Aden is a “failed state.”  Eritrea, the Sudan, Ethiopia – all of these states bordering either Somalia or the Gulf of Aden itself top the list of Failed States.  They have little or no means of enforcing laws within their own borders, let alone attempting to work together to stem the tide of Somali pirates.

While simply identifying states that are struggling to maintain control over their physical territory cannot stem the tide of piracy, it can help in predicting growth trends and likely “hot spots” for piracy, that have not yet been identified.  A more detailed analysis of the geopolitical context for modern-day piracy, can be found in the following www.drheathermark.com

Dr. Heather Mark, PhD