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Indian Navy Ignores Pleas During Pirate Attack June 17, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security.
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According to NDTV the MV Suez, a ship and her crew that were held captive for nine months by Somali pirates came under attack again almost immediately after being released.  The called for help to thwart the pirate attack and was ignored by the Indian navy and it was the Pakistani Navy’s PNS Babar that had to support the Suez.  Earlier the Indian government had stated that the responsibility for security fell to the ships.  The owners of the ship told NDTV yesterday that they had approached the Indian government for help. In an email to NDTV, a senior company official said, “I’ve contacted the (Indian) Navy, but there’s no response. I have called them so many times.” He says Indian officials advised him to “call the NATO hot line and ask if they have any war ship in this area for escort.”

This sad situation further illustrates the lack of coordination and effectiveness of the coalition efforts to protect merchant vessels and further highlights the need for ship owners to take responsibility for security of their vessels.

Analysis of “Are Weapons the Answer to Counter Ship Piracy?” Part 1 of 2 June 14, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management, weapons and tactics.
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Recently I was reading an article on Maritime Executive and a few of the comments gave me pause which, I believe, requires a response.  This post will attempt to objectively analyze the underlying issues outlined in the article.  Brevity precludes a comprehensive critique of the article so only the major identified issues will be addressed in this post

Notice that the term objectively is italicized in the first paragraph.  The first aspect of the article that raises issues is the assertion that it is ‘objective’.  As defined by Webster’s dictionary:

“a : expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations “ 

Simply saying that an article is ‘objective’ does not make it so.  It is impossible for any position paper to be ‘objective’ in that the author is attempting to make an argument to support their conclusion.

In reading the article, the author clearly has an agenda as articulated in the final sentence of the conclusion where he definitively states:

“The potential means of reducing the commercial return for pirates and of imposing considerable financial pressures on them currently exists within the power of the industry, without resort to arms.”

Furthermore, in an attempt to assuage the readers’ fears that the author is not being objective, a disclaimer is provided in which the author acknowledges “…his interest through its support to GAC Solutions in the provision of maritime security services and support to maritime clients.”

With the conclusion clearly articulated and the author’s position within the industry identified for the readers,  it is now possible to review some of the premises, which ostensibly support the conclusion.

In the background section of the article, the author editorializes while making several strong claims.  Namely he asserts that:

“..the debate (about arming ships) currently seems to be driven more by the following: fear induced pressure on the stakeholders; the questionable authority of some proponents of arming ships; frustration throughout the industry at the apparent ease with which pirates can gain access and control of ships.”

This author would suggest that “the apparent ease” of gaining access and control of ships is a legitimate concern for ship owners and does not suggest an environment of pressure born out of fear.  A disturbing aspect of the article is the imperious attitude of the author when he suggests that some proponents of arming ships are of ‘questionable authority’.   Many proponents of arming ships (this author included) have experience and education that would likely merit some level of respect of their positions.

He further states that:

“The effect of an over-dramatic media creates a perception of the frequency and impact of piracy attacks that is not borne out by statistics. Also, the argument for arming ships increasingly relies on the use of the strap line “No ship with armed escorts has been taken.” There are many equally true statements such as, “ships with particular funnel markings have not been taken””.

While this blog post is not intended to dissect the statistical aspects of the argument, when discussing risk there are two primary components; probability and impact.  While the probability of a ship being taken is, in fact small, it is suggested that the impact is anything but trivial.  In fact, yesterday it was acknowledged that pirates received a ‘double-figure million US dollar” ransom.  When evaluating the risk from an annualized loss expectancy perspective, it is suggested that arming ships does in fact, make financial sense.  The last statement related to ships being taken merits no further response as any college freshman statistics student would rightly identify that the funnel markings would be considered a spurious relationship while the armed escorts would be considered statistically relevant. To read more about risk and risk analysis please read this post.

The last section that stands out is the one titled Weapons and effects.  I was apoplectic when I read the author’s assertion that:

“Hollywood and the media have greatly exaggerated the destructive power of such weapons as the RPG7, while the AK47 has an iconic status. The RPG7 is a rocket propelled grenade, with very limited capability and effect. The AK47 is a superb close quarter battle weapon, ideal for insurgents, pirates and many others, because of its simplicity and functionality. However, it is a very inaccurate weapon, with little penetration capability. Both can, and do, create a situation of panic and fear in those with no understanding because of the noise effect and peoples unrealistic image of their capabilities”

Once again the author attempts to assert authority on the subject by demeaning readers who lack the same experience as the author.  He clearly intimates that the reason people are afraid of the RPG 7 and AK 47 is because they lack understanding of the weapons, the weapons are loud, and people have unrealistic images of their capabilities.  While certainly shows like Rambo and the A-Team portrait unrealistic capabilities of weapons, this author also has experience with such weapons and can state definitively that RPG 7’s and AK 47’s deserve respect.  To suggest otherwise is irresponsible to those who may not have the requisite experience to understand the destructive capabilities of such weapons.  More information can be found in the post titled: “Whitpaper on Weapons and Tactics”

Part 2 will continue the analysis.

Realpolitik, Piracy, and Armchair Quarterbacks April 24, 2011

Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management.
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I was reading an article on CNN yesterday related to maritime piracy that struck me as interesting. It also just so happens that I have some experience with the topic of the article.

I have had the fortunate opportunity to travel and teach globally.  Anyone that has listened to me speak has heard me say: “In my opinion anyone who tells you that “All you need to do to fix problem X is to do Y…” probably does not understand much about security, risk or business.”    Within politics there is a concept known as realpolitik.  Wikipedia defines it as: “…politics or diplomacy based primarily on power and on practical and material factors and considerations, rather than ideological notions or moralistic or ethical premises.”  It is the difference between theory and practice that often creates challenges in life, politics, and anti-piracy.

The article to which I am referring was written by a very prominent person with over 24 books to his name.  While I would not think to question or debate on the nuances of political theory or economics in this case I found a statement very interesting and relevant and it highlights the differences between Realpolitik and theory very well.

The article was referring to piracy within the Gulf of Aden and specifically off of the coast of Somalia.  In the article, the author writes:

“All we need to do (emphasis added) is declare that for ships on the high sea, a 300-yard radius around the vessels is a limited access zone. Anybody closing in farther without permission will be assumed to be hostile. First, warning shots will be fired across their bow; if this will not do, shoot to kill.

True, this means that merchant ships will need some armed marshals, as do many flights. However, given that the ships are tall and the pirates need to mount them from their small boats, a few armed guards can do the job.”

Here is where theory and practice diverge and armchair quarterbacking takes over.  It is easy to be an armchair quarterback (or in this case ship’s crew) when it is not your own very expensive ship on the line or your own life on the line when the RPGs start flying. I can say from personal experience that it is less fun  being shot at in real life than the movies may suggest.  Additionally, the article ignores the much larger socio-political aspects of piracy.

To understand the feasibilityof what the author suggested let’s dissect what he is saying a little more closely.  He states that a 300 yard radius should be imposed around the ships.

In Somalia pirates are attacking ships using small skiffs that often travel over 40 knots (~46 mph).  Their skiffs are small, lightweight and agile.  The pirates attack ships using multiple boats and primarily carrying RPG-7 rocket propelled grenades, PKM machine guns, and AK-47 assault rifles.  They have little fear and are very aggressive.  In short, these guys are armed to the teeth and very capable.

On a 30ft x 8ft target moving at 9 mph the US Army gives the RPG 7 a hit probability of 22% at 300 meters, 51% at 200 meters, and 96% at 100 meters.  If one considers that the bridge or rudder of ship is the target and doubles the size of the target listed in the Army study, it is fair to say the hit probability doubles, as well.  This means that at 300 meters, the pirates have a 50/50 chance of hitting the bridge or rudder and doing serious damage to the ship.   If a pirate gets within 200 meters of the ship, their chance of a hit increases statistically to 100%.  The answer, according to the author, is to “…fire warning shots across their bow; if this will not do, shoot to kill.”- If they get within 300 meters.   The author then goes on to say that: “a few armed guards can do the job.” 

As a former Marine sniper with combat experience,  I would consider myself competent with a number of different weapons systems.  I also have experience guarding ships in Somalia.  I can say with absolute confidence that firing: “…warning shots across their bow..” and then: “…shoot(ing) to kill…” at a moving target on the open ocean 300 meters away is a lot easier for action stars like Matt Damon or Sylvester Stallone in thier movies than it is for real people in real situations.  In fact, what the author is proposing is very difficult.  To demonstrate some of the challenges, let us take a quick look at what is involved.

Consider that you are on a ship which is travelling 10 knots (creating a wind that affects the shot that this article will not address).  Consider that you now also have to keep your sights on a very small skiff travelling at 50 knots at 300 meters all while the ship and the boats are bouncing on the ocean swells. Assuming the skiff is traveling parallel with your own boat its relative speed is 40 knots.   At 40 knots, the skiff is travelling at almost 67.5 feet per second or the length of a football field every 4.4 seconds.  This means that with a .300 Winchester  Magnum  round travelling 3050 feet per second, a shooter would need to lead the boat 24.25 feet on a stable platform to account for the speed of the boat and the .36 seconds it takes the bullet to traverse the 300 meters (accounting for decease in velocity for you math geniuses).  This basic calculation does not account for the vertical movement of the ship or boat or the relative movement between the ship and the boat nor does it account for any wind that may be present.  Assuming your target is a person and is 1.2 feet across it is in the ‘hit zone’ for only .013 of a second when travelling at 40 knots.  This means that your lead ‘cushion’ is only .9 feet or 10.8 inches.   In short, if you lead more 25.04 feet or less than 23.36 feet, you have missed your target completely.  If your lead is perfect and you have miscalculated the distance of your target by only 10 meters, you have also missed your target.

Suffice it to say that shooting at a small, high speed target while on a moving platform is more than difficult.  It is extremely difficult.   Couple this with the fact that the pirates are masquerading as fishermen and you have compounded the issue because nobody wants to make a mistake and hurt an innocent person.  In short, the last action any ship’s captain (or security personnel) wants to take is to get into a shootout with pirates that are carrying big guns that can do a lot of damage.  Once the shooting starts, things can turn badly in short order.  The best answer is (to quote Monte Python when they are being attacked by the rabbit)...”Run away..run away…”  A show of force and situational awareness will often dissuade the pirates from attacking you.  There is no shame in outrunning the pirates with the ship without firing a single shot and everyone on it safe and sound.  Discretion is the better part of valor 99% of the time.

When it becomes necessary to respond to fire or otherwise engage the pirates to protect the ship or her crew, discipline, and experience are critical.  As can be seen in the post, engaging moving targets from a moving platform is difficult and requires specialized skills and training.

Piracy and Failed States April 18, 2011

Posted by Heather Mark in Failed States, Piracy & Maritime Security.
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Governments that are unable to enforce laws within their own boundaries or project and protect their interests outside of their geographical limits are largely considered to be failed state.  The Fund for Peace studies 12 specific characteristics of failed state in their annual Failed States Index.   This serves as a very comprehensive analysis of what causes states to fail.  However, for the purposes of analyzing the genesis, spread and growth of modern-day piracy, the inability of a state to project force will serve as the definition.

The ability to project force is an essential characteristic of a functioning state. Not only does this enable states to maintain order within their domestic boundaries, it serves notice on those outside of the country’s borders that the state can and will protect their interests abroad – whether that means in the diplomatic community or in international waters.  When governments lose the ability to protect their interests, it ceases to be a legitimate government.  Its citizens no longer depend on the state for protection and its enemies (in this case pirates) begin to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the failed state structures.

The Gulf of Aden provides an ample illustration of how failing and failed states have allowed piracy to take root and flourish.  Somalia is a failed state.  In fact, it ranks at number one on the Failed States Index.  Its governmental organs are non-existent.  There is no recognized law, nor is there any means to enforce that law if it did exist.  Somali pirates often claim to be members of the Somali Navy or Coast Guard enforcing fishing rights in the region.  Since  no actual Somali Navy or Coast Guard exists, there is no one to prevent such acts from occurring.  One might suggest then that regional collective security arrangements might be beneficial in taking on the problem of piracy.  An examination of the surrounding states, however, once demonstrates why collective security arrangements would fail.

Djibouti, Somalia’s neighbor to the north, is considered a “failing” state.  Yemen, the state directly across the Gulf of Aden is a “failed state.”  Eritrea, the Sudan, Ethiopia – all of these states bordering either Somalia or the Gulf of Aden itself top the list of Failed States.  They have little or no means of enforcing laws within their own borders, let alone attempting to work together to stem the tide of Somali pirates.

While simply identifying states that are struggling to maintain control over their physical territory cannot stem the tide of piracy, it can help in predicting growth trends and likely “hot spots” for piracy, that have not yet been identified.  A more detailed analysis of the geopolitical context for modern-day piracy, can be found in the following www.drheathermark.com

Dr. Heather Mark, PhD