2012 – Another “Massive” Credit Card Breach March 30, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Industry News, InfoSec & Privacy.Tags: Chris Mark, data breach, fraud, InfoSec, mastercard, PCI DSS, security, visa
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According to Krebsonsecurity, the payment card industry has been wracked by yet another massive data breach. The story says that Visa and MasterCard are alerting companies to a US processor that was breached. This, according to reports, is a breach of Track1 and Track2 data. For those unfamiliar with credit cards, track1 and track 2 data is what is known as “magnetic stripe data” and is used to counterfeit cards as it contains the sensitive authentication data necessary for retail (card present) transactions. This is the most dangerous and valuable data to criminals.
As stated on the site: “In separate non-public alerts sent late last week, VISA and MasterCard began warning banks about specific cards that may have been compromised. The card associations stated that the breached credit card processor was compromised between Jan. 21, 2012 and Feb. 25, 2012.”
BitDefender: “Anonymous is ‘good’ for security” – REALLY?! March 28, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in InfoSec & Privacy, Laws and Leglslation, Risk & Risk Management.Tags: bitdefender, Chris Mark, cybersecurity, mark consulting group, PCI DSS, security, slutwalk
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A March 14th, 2012 article on ZDNetAsia sums up one of the major problems with security. Specifically, it is the victims that are consistently blamed for the crime and the belief (very arrogant, I might add) that companies simply don’t care about security and this is why they are victimized. According to the article:
“Alexandu Catalin Cosoi, chief security researcher at BitDefender, for one, said that hacktivist group Anonymous has been “good” for security. This is because even though it had disclosed people’s personal information publicly online, the security breaches it organized had a positive impact, he added. Now, more companies are willing to secure their networks and private data, which is good news, he stated.” (more…)
Now Data Thieves Steal…Credit Reports? March 27, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in InfoSec & Privacy, Risk & Risk Management.Tags: Chris Mark, credit report, cybercrime, cybersecurity, identity theft, InfoSec, MSNBC, PCI DSS, privacy
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A great story on MSNBC outlines yet another method being used by data thieves to monetize private information. According to the story, data thieves are stealing credit reports and then reselling to identity thieves. The process works like this. A data thief steals credit reports from the credit reporting agencies. Depending upon the score (higher the better) the data thief then resells the report to an identity thief who uses the report to get credit in the user’s name. Because the credit report has so much information, it makes the process of assuming someone else identity very easy. Remember, full credit reports have social security number, banks, loans, mortgages and other information. Much of authentication being used today relies upon the additional personal questions such as: “which is a bank at which you have had an account?” Most of the sites hosting the stolen reports have an .su domain which was used for the Soviet Union. According to the report, the hackers brag about how easy it is to hack into certain sites such as: AnnualCreditReport.com or CreditReport.com. Depending upon the score on the report, each report can command as much as $80 (for higher scores) or have that amount for lower scores.
This adds yet another wrinkle for people to fear.
“A Failed State of Security”; Deterrence Theory & CyberCrime (Research Brief) March 5, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Industry News, InfoSec & Privacy, Risk & Risk Management.Tags: Chris Mark, cybersecurity, data breach, data security, deterrence theory, markconsultinggroup.com, PCI DSS, security
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Expanding on the concept of Rational Deterrence and its effect on crime, we have published a research brief on Deterrence Theory and Its Effect on CyberCrime. The brief outlines the failing strategy of compelling companies to prevent breaches without deterring those who commit the crimes. You download the brief (all 25 pages) here. Below is a short excerpt:
“At RSA’s annual security convention, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Robert Mueller stated, on February 28th, 2012, ominously: “There are only two types of companies. Those that have been hacked and those that will be.”[1] At the same event, the CEO of RSA, told the audience: “Our networks will be penetrated. We should no longer be surprised by this.” He further stated: “The reality today is that we are in an arms race with our adversaries, and right now, more often than not, they are winning.”[2] The comments, while accurate, are late in coming. RSA, one of the worlds’ largest security vendors, was breached in 2011. The breach was more than a simple theft of customer data. The breach was a theft of intellectual property that compromised the infrastructure of RSA’s 2-factor authentication system known as SecureID. This potentially exposed thousands (if not more) of companies to a bypass of their own access control mechanism.
RSA’s CEO then continued: (more…)
PCI DSS and Piracy January 12, 2012
Posted by Heather Mark in PCI DSS, Piracy & Maritime Security.Tags: cybersecurity, Heather Mark, InfoSec, InfoSec & Privacy, Maritime Security, mark consulting group, PCI DSS, Piracy & Maritime Security
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I’ve been reading quite a bit on piracy lately. Not the adventurous, swashbuckling tales of pirates flying down the Spanish Main, but piracy in its present form. From a purely detached perspective, its an interesting exercise in cause and effect. Natural disasters, for example, have an impact on the surge in piratical acts. The Christmas Tsunami left many Somali fishing villages devastated and took the last legal means of sustenance from many families that depended fishing for their survival. As a result, they turned to piracy. Of course, that is not to say that Somali pirates are the Jean val Jean’s of their day, the thief with the heart of gold doing only what is necessary to survive. These pirates are violent and aggressive and should not be coddled. The interesting comparison to the PCI DSS, in my mind, derives from the impact of the crime on the industry and the global reaction to the phenomenon.
Impact of the Crime
Piracy is a crime that has an impact on all consumers. Higher insurance rates, security contingents, longer routes and therefore higher fuel costs, and similar circumstances that result from piracy mean higher prices for consumers. Any costs that cannot (or will not) be absorbed by the manufacturer or the shipping company are passed on to the consumer. Similarly, data thieves have very definitely left their mark on the consumer. Those of us involved in the electronic payment industry recognize better than most the increased cost structure that has resulted from trying to achieve and maintain compliance with the PCI DSS and the countless data security, data breach notification and consumer privacy laws at play in the United States. Ongoing compliance and security monitoring, evaluating the threat landscape and the cost of validating compliance can quickly add up for companies. Organizations that are already seeing their margins get squeezed are required to spend additional resources on security and compliance to ensure the safety of consumers’ data. Those costs can sometimes be passed along to the consumer.
Global Reaction
Data security and piracy were both issues that “flew under the radar” until high-profile instances brought them to the public awareness. In the world of transoceanic shipping, the issues that brought awareness were a couple of kidnappings for ransom and the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama. It’s important to note, however, that even before these incidents, the shipping industry and governments worldwide were working on standards and regulations that would mitigate the problem. The reaction from the industry should sound very familiar to veterans of the PCI DSS compliance world – “The standards are too prescriptive.” “The standards were written by people that don’t
really understand the issues.” “How are you going to ensure that everyone is complying with these standards?’ “The cost of complying with the standards are too burdensome for small companies.” These concerns should resonate with payment security professionals. The same questions and concerns are often raised about the PCI DSS.
For the payment industry, the events that really brought public awareness were a couple of high-profile data breaches at well-known retailers. The question really is, though, “What is the alternative?” If neither industry had done anything to address these growing issues, the constituents in the industry would have raised the alarm about the apparent lack of concern from the powers that be. The catch-22 of the creation and enforcement of the standards is that even though these standards achieve their objective of raising industry awareness and attempting to mitigate the risk of adverse events, the companies that suffer piracy attacks or data breaches are still often cast as the villian (as opposed to the victim) in the scenario.
What’s the Answer?
That is the crux of the matter – are the issues of data security and high seas piracy “solvable?” There are a variety of issues that drive the increase in both crimes. Economic stability, the ability of governments to project their authority into these areas, jurisdictional cooperation and other factors drive the growth of both types of crimes.
While I cannot confidently address permanent solutions to either problem, I can suggest a shift in perspective. In the realm of data security and payment security, practitioners often attempt to solve the problem by layering more and more technology in front of the sensitive data. Tokenization is one example of how a shift in perspective can provide alternative solutions. Extracting value from the data makes significantly less attractive to thieves. So instead of asking, “How can we keep thieves from accessing the data?” one might ask “What can be done in the transaction processing chain to render the data unusable to thieves?” We are currently retro-fitting security onto a system that has been in place for fifty years. If we were to remove any preconcieved notions of what a payment infrastructure should look like, what would we design?