Snipers on Ships….Good Idea…or Overkill? (Pun Intended) January 26, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security, weapons and tactics.Tags: Chris Mark, Maritime Security, mark consulting group, Piracy & Maritime Security, Scout Sniper. Royal Marine Sniper, weapons
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I was reading a website today of what appears to be a new entrant into the maritime security world. It is clear that they are trying to differentiate their services by offering ‘Maritime Marksmanship’ services. According to the website, their former Royal Marine Snipers can add protection to 900 meters by adding precision, long range fire. As a former US Marine Sniper I am very familiar with, and have great respect for the Royal Marines’ sniper course and while we like to argue and debate with each other over whose course is superior, the truth is that the discussion is academic. Whether you believe it is the USMC or our UK brethren, the reality is that they are both arguably the most rigorous sniper courses in the world. We will continue to argue 😉 So back to my post.
While I don’t disagree that having trained snipers onboard provides a level of precision shooting, the question that must be asked is “how much is good enough?” The truth is that not a single armed vessel has been successfully hijacked to date. Many of the vessels are armed with M4s (or varients), AK 47s, G3s, FALs etc. Is there truly at need at this juncture for a trained sniper on board? A more fundamental question, I think, is whether you increase liability by placing a sniper onboard. If a pirate is approach a vessel at high speed and shooting then there is a threat. Using the force continuum it is expected that first evasive maneuvers are taken, followed by warning shots etc. If they approach close enough then, possibly, you need to take more direct action and fire at the assailants. International law is still somewhat unclear as to when you can and cannot use deadly force on a suspected pirate. I question what would happen to the shooter if he shot a pirate out of a boat at 900m. It would be extremely difficult to justify such a shooting as ‘defensive’. (I suspect such a shot would be nearly impossible for any trained shooter…see next post as to why).
I believe at this point that having trained Commandos, US Marines (with appropriate background), or other well trained military members provides sufficient protection against pirate attacks. Any Commando, US Marine, Ranger etc. with an M4, or similar weapon system can engage a target to 300 meters with relative ease. Extending this range to a theoretical 900 meters does not, in my mind, reduce risk but may actually increase the risk should a suspected pirate be engaged at that distance.
For companies considering maritime security, it is suggested that the following be considered before considering the more esoteric aspects of armed services.
1) Are the company’s leaders experienced in maritime security and have they established and documented operating procedures consistent with the rules of force and international law? You do NOT want a bunch of gunslinging cowboys on your ships. Consider BlackWater as an example of what happens when undisciplined people with weapons are unleashed.
2) Are the armed guards appropriately vetted and trained? As much as I love my USMC, the fact remains that in the USMC, we have a number of Marines that are cooks, mechanics, etc. In the UK, all Marines are Commando trained. The point being that just because someone has a particular title, does not mean they are right for the job. Ensure that the company is selective and vets their personnel. Additionally, ask about following on training. Are the guards taught the rules of force?
3) Are the guards provided with appropriate kit and weapons? I have heard horror stories of guards being deployed with Moisan Nagant rifles, and other ‘pre WWII’ weaponry. While the debate over whether .50 sniper rifles provide good fodder for arguments, at a minimum the guards need to be armed with effective, modern weapons in working order. M4s, G3, FAL, M14s, AK 74, AK 47 are probably all sufficient to rappel an attack by Somali pirates. I personally do NOT believe that a shotgun is sufficient. A shotgun is great for close quarters fighting but does not have the range or accuracy to defend against an attacker with an RPG or AK 47.
4) Does the company’s principals have experience with maritime traditions, rules, and communications? It is imperative that the guards understand how to work on ships and how to interact with the ship’s officers and crew. Ultimately, it is the ships captain that has responsibility for the vessel and her crew. The guards need to understand how to integrate into the ship’s plans to ensure effective protection of the vessel.
Experts in Every Room and One Dunce in a Corner January 25, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Piracy & Maritime Security.Tags: Anti Piracy, Chris Mark, expertise defined, Maritime Security, Piracy & Maritime Security
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The influx of new companies within the maritime security industry has increased competition. In response, some companies have given in to the temptation to embellish the experience or expertise of individuals or companies in an attempt to differentiate themselves from the crowd. It is an unfortunate reality of business. In an effort to help shipping companies evaluate the vendors selling “today’s solution to tomorrow’s problem”, I have put together a quick paper on ‘expertise’. Below is an excerpt of the paper you can read here:
“Introduction
The current market for maritime security and anti-piracy has resulted in the creation of a cottage industry of self-proclaimed experts speaking on the subject of anti-piracy and selling maritime security and anti-piracy services. A review of some of these “experts’” comments and the services being promoted suggests that the expertise espoused is a rarer trait than one would be led to believe. This paper is intended to provide information to allow prospective clients to separate the experts from those that claim expertise to capitalize on the current market for maritime security services. For brevity’s sake, this paper will use the generic term Maritime Security to refer to both anti-piracy and maritime security services.
Author’s Note
While knowledgeable on the subject, I do not consider myself an expert in maritime security. I am a payment security expert and probably have expertise in a number of other areas but have not achieved a level of experience or education that would allow me to call myself an expert by any means.
Expertise Defined
To understand how to identify those with actual expertise from those who simply call themselves experts it is important to have a definition of the term ‘expert’. Webster’s dictionary provides the following definition for the noun ‘expert’:
Noun:
“…one with the special skill or knowledge representing mastery of a particular subject”
Within the context of maritime security, expert, as a noun would be applied as follows:
“Joe is an Expert in maritime security.”
Making this statement implies that Joe possesses a special skill or knowledge representing mastery of a particular subject. In this case, the subject is maritime security. The focus of this statement should be the word “mastery”. This suggests that Joe possesses an intimate knowledge rather than a passing familiarity with the topic.
Webster’s dictionary provides the following definition for the adjective ‘expert’:
Adjective:
“…having, involving, or displaying special skill or knowledge derived from training or experience”
Within the context of maritime security the term expert, as an adjective, would be applied as follows:
“Joe’s expertise in maritime security is derived from his formal training and experience.”
Making this statement indicates that Joe has a special skill or knowledge derived from training or experience. Within this context, the key is “training or experience”. Without relevant or appropriate training or experience (or both, in most cases), it is difficult to see how a person could be defined as an ‘expert’.
Consider the example of a Doctor that has passed her medical boards. While the doctor may be a general practitioner and not considered an expert in neurosurgery, she would arguably be considered an expert in medicine relative to those who have not attended similar training or passed the medical boards. The doctor’s expertise is qualified by training (medical school) and experience (residency), as well as quantified by passing medical school boards. If a person were to sit at home and read anatomy and medical books they could certainly attain some level of medical knowledge but it is extremely difficult to see how a person such as the one described would be considered an ‘expert’ in medicine.
While it is not suggested that becoming an expert within the maritime security industry is similar to that of becoming a neurosurgeon, the complexity of the industry and the maritime security challenges should not be underestimated since valuable resources and human lives are at stake. The maritime security industry is complex and the ever-changing regulatory landscape coupled with the changes the pirates’ tactics increase the complexity. In his popular book, Outliers, Malcolm McGladry references Neurologist Daniel Levetin who says:
“The emerging pictures from such studies is that ten thousand hours of practice is required to achieve the level of mastery associated with being a world-class expert-in anything.””
You can read the full paper here.
PCI DSS and Piracy January 12, 2012
Posted by Heather Mark in PCI DSS, Piracy & Maritime Security.Tags: cybersecurity, Heather Mark, InfoSec, InfoSec & Privacy, Maritime Security, mark consulting group, PCI DSS, Piracy & Maritime Security
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I’ve been reading quite a bit on piracy lately. Not the adventurous, swashbuckling tales of pirates flying down the Spanish Main, but piracy in its present form. From a purely detached perspective, its an interesting exercise in cause and effect. Natural disasters, for example, have an impact on the surge in piratical acts. The Christmas Tsunami left many Somali fishing villages devastated and took the last legal means of sustenance from many families that depended fishing for their survival. As a result, they turned to piracy. Of course, that is not to say that Somali pirates are the Jean val Jean’s of their day, the thief with the heart of gold doing only what is necessary to survive. These pirates are violent and aggressive and should not be coddled. The interesting comparison to the PCI DSS, in my mind, derives from the impact of the crime on the industry and the global reaction to the phenomenon.
Impact of the Crime
Piracy is a crime that has an impact on all consumers. Higher insurance rates, security contingents, longer routes and therefore higher fuel costs, and similar circumstances that result from piracy mean higher prices for consumers. Any costs that cannot (or will not) be absorbed by the manufacturer or the shipping company are passed on to the consumer. Similarly, data thieves have very definitely left their mark on the consumer. Those of us involved in the electronic payment industry recognize better than most the increased cost structure that has resulted from trying to achieve and maintain compliance with the PCI DSS and the countless data security, data breach notification and consumer privacy laws at play in the United States. Ongoing compliance and security monitoring, evaluating the threat landscape and the cost of validating compliance can quickly add up for companies. Organizations that are already seeing their margins get squeezed are required to spend additional resources on security and compliance to ensure the safety of consumers’ data. Those costs can sometimes be passed along to the consumer.
Global Reaction
Data security and piracy were both issues that “flew under the radar” until high-profile instances brought them to the public awareness. In the world of transoceanic shipping, the issues that brought awareness were a couple of kidnappings for ransom and the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama. It’s important to note, however, that even before these incidents, the shipping industry and governments worldwide were working on standards and regulations that would mitigate the problem. The reaction from the industry should sound very familiar to veterans of the PCI DSS compliance world – “The standards are too prescriptive.” “The standards were written by people that don’t
really understand the issues.” “How are you going to ensure that everyone is complying with these standards?’ “The cost of complying with the standards are too burdensome for small companies.” These concerns should resonate with payment security professionals. The same questions and concerns are often raised about the PCI DSS.
For the payment industry, the events that really brought public awareness were a couple of high-profile data breaches at well-known retailers. The question really is, though, “What is the alternative?” If neither industry had done anything to address these growing issues, the constituents in the industry would have raised the alarm about the apparent lack of concern from the powers that be. The catch-22 of the creation and enforcement of the standards is that even though these standards achieve their objective of raising industry awareness and attempting to mitigate the risk of adverse events, the companies that suffer piracy attacks or data breaches are still often cast as the villian (as opposed to the victim) in the scenario.
What’s the Answer?
That is the crux of the matter – are the issues of data security and high seas piracy “solvable?” There are a variety of issues that drive the increase in both crimes. Economic stability, the ability of governments to project their authority into these areas, jurisdictional cooperation and other factors drive the growth of both types of crimes.
While I cannot confidently address permanent solutions to either problem, I can suggest a shift in perspective. In the realm of data security and payment security, practitioners often attempt to solve the problem by layering more and more technology in front of the sensitive data. Tokenization is one example of how a shift in perspective can provide alternative solutions. Extracting value from the data makes significantly less attractive to thieves. So instead of asking, “How can we keep thieves from accessing the data?” one might ask “What can be done in the transaction processing chain to render the data unusable to thieves?” We are currently retro-fitting security onto a system that has been in place for fifty years. If we were to remove any preconcieved notions of what a payment infrastructure should look like, what would we design?
The Geopolitical Context of Piracy by Dr. Heather Mark January 3, 2012
Posted by Chris Mark in Failed States, Laws and Leglslation, Piracy & Maritime Security, Risk & Risk Management.Tags: Dr. Heather Mark, geopolitical context of piracy, mark consulting group, Piracy & Maritime Security, Somalia
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This is a guest post by Dr. Heather Mark. This is a short article of a larger whitepaper titled “Understanding Modern Piracy: Geopolitical and Regulatory Considerations” which is found here.
“Executive Summary
The scourge of modern piracy is often unrecognized by the general public. However, those involved in the Maritime industries are all too familiar with the danger, both physical and economic, posed by pirates. Modern pirates hearken less to the romantic imagery of the swashbuckling adventurer than they do to the violent, mercenary gangsters that they more closely resemble. Such imagery, however, does little to explain the pirates’ motivations, their impact on shipping and the reaction of the governments whose economies are threatened by their actions.
The following paper will provide a brief analysis of the current impact of piracy on shipping, and the geopolitical context that allows these criminals to thrive. Further, the paper will provide an overview and analysis of some of the international efforts to curtail piratical activity and their effectiveness.
“Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war…”
-Woodrow Wilson, The 14 Points
Introduction
Modern piracy can best be described as a hidden plague on the economies of the world. While most are unaware of, or perhaps simply do not understand, the pervasiveness and impact of piracy on international shipping lanes, the phenomenon is very real and has a tangible impact, not only on the maritime industry, but also on the global economy. As the global economy struggles with worldwide recession, failing and failed states are acting as a breeding ground for organized piratical activity – from “muggings” at anchor to armed hijackings while underway.
The lack of awareness of the piracy issue, however, does not mean that this is a victimless crime or even one that has little to no impact on the public. There are very tangible costs to the crime wave for which everyone pays. For example, should a ship be the victim of a pirate attack, the owner can choose to report the incident to the appropriate authorities. If the owner does so, it must absorb not only the cost directly associated with the attack (delays and interruptions to name just a few) but must also bear the legal costs that are associated with the attack investigation.[1] This also invariably leads to higher insurance premiums, as well.
Given the costs associated with choosing to report acts of piracy, it should come as no surprise that as many as 50% of incidents are unreported. Over the last five years, incidents of piracy have grown increasingly common. In 2009 alone there were over 400 incidents of reported piracy. According to statistics from the International Maritime Bureau, acts of piracy are growing more and more violent as pirates learn from their experience, re-invest their ill-gotten gains to strengthen their criminal enterprise and widen their area of operations.
It is important that these criminals and their intentions not be underestimated. There is an apparent tendency to discount the sophistication of modern pirates. The fact that they often attack in traditional fishing vessels, dhows and skiffs often belies the shrewd organization and violent intentions of those orchestrating the attacks. In order to better understand the phenomenon of modern piracy, one must understand the origins of the crimes. What may have begun as a desperate turn by individuals seeking to supplement their dwindling incomes has become a serious plague on the international Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC).
Despite the growing impact of piracy on the shipping industry, the general public has yet to demonstrate a sustained interest in combating piracy on an ongoing basis. American public opinion has been singularly focused on issues of terrorism since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Though many scholars have theorized about a connection between piracy and terrorism there has yet to arise a substantive, tangible relationship between the two criminal acts. At their core, the two acts have very different aims – piracy is undertaken for purely economic reasons and requires secrecy and anonymity so that the criminals can continue their activities, while terrorism is undertaking for ideological reasons requires an audience to be effective[2].
Looking at the activities of piracy only tells part of the story, however. In order to understand the phenomenon of modern piracy, one must understand the underlying causes. These individuals and, in many cases, organizations, do not exist in a vacuum and are a product of the environment in which they exist. There are certainly variables that give rise to conditions favorable to crime. This paper will examine some of those conditions, including the geopolitical and economic contexts that may give rise to piracy.
Geopolitical Context
There are a number of factors that must be addressed when examining modern piracy from a geopolitical perspective. Not only must one examine the constraints facing states in fighting piracy, but one must also examine the features that allow piracy to thrive. There is a discussion of law enforcement that cites three critical elements in the prevention of crime. Of the three elements deterrence is perhaps the most important. In other words, the criminals must perceive greater danger to themselves in perpetrating the crime (ie. getting caught, wounded or killed in the act)than they see reward in committing the crime and escaping. In geopolitical terms, the deterrence of crimes becomes increasingly complex, particularly when dealing with issues of sovereignty and failed, or failing, states. For the sake of brevity, this paper will not attempt to examine every possible cause of international piracy, but will simply highlight those issues that best demonstrate the roots of the issue and the complexity associated with combating piracy.
State Sovereignty
Efforts to address international issues often give rise to conflicts of state sovereignty. The very existence of the United Nations still leads to heated debate in a variety of circles. While it is certain that international cooperation is beneficial for a number of reasons, there are those that feel that belonging to the cooperative necessarily results in the dilution of sovereignty. If countries cannot, or are at least discouraged from, taking unilateral action, one must question the degree to which they are maintaining their sovereignty in light of the communal pressures.
Contrast the need to maintain state sovereignty with the need for collective security agreements, however. Collective security agreements remain a fact of international life, the driving notion being that there is safety in numbers, for states as well as individuals. Alliances are necessary to mitigate the threat of hostility. Security and sovereignty are two fundamental requirements for the longevity of the state. These two competing needs require states to master the delicate balance of maintaining their independence and sovereignty while cooperating with neighboring states to the extent necessary to achieve stability and security.
Inis Claude describes the challenge of collective security: “Collective security requires the relinquishment of the sovereign free hand in the most vital issues of foreign policy, the abandonment of national biases for and against other states, and a consequent willingness to follow the lead of organs of the community in taking action in opposition to any aggressor, on behalf of any victim[3].” With this description in mind, one can begin to see the struggles that face the collective efforts to combat piracy, particularly in littoral regions bordered by states that are taking pains to project themselves as a strong, sovereign power. One of the most piracy prone areas in the world, the Malacca Straits, provides ample illustration.
The Trilateral Coordinated Patrol, introduced in 2004, was a joint effort among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to patrol the littoral waters along the coast in an effort to deter piracy. However, in its initial implementation, the Patrol failed to produce a significant reduction in piratical acts in the area. This was at least partially attributed to the fact that the Patrol failed to allow for cross-border pursuit[4]. Issues of state sovereignty discouraged the presence of foreign navies in state waters, even in the pursuit of dangerous criminals and for the purposes of collective security.
Recent reports, from the Indonesian embassy, estimate that the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol has succeeded in reducing piracy in the area by 70%[5]. That being said, the International Maritime Bureau still cites the Malacca Straits as one of the most piracy prone areas in the world and advises ships to use extreme caution when moving through the region. Indonesia and Malaysia in particular are wary of international assistance for the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol, while Singapore has been is more welcoming.
Issues of state sovereignty are further involved due to the fact that most acts of piracy occur within the “12 nm territorial seas or the 200nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ) claimed by most states, according to Richard O’Meara. O’Meara ascribes the complications in deterrence and prosecution of pirates to the fact that they must be dealt with according to the “vagaries of local criminal codes, administration processes, resource allocation, and corruption[6].”
Consider that piracy takes place in stages, many of which begin on land. Planning, supplying and orchestrating the attack are often carried out on land. In addition, the pirates may attack domestic ports or steal ships at port with which they can then use to carry out their operations at sea. These domestic issues fall under the jurisdiction of the local governments and law enforcement agencies. For many states, allowing international law to determine the extent of deterrence and enforcement that takes place domestically is akin to sacrificing sovereignty. For that reason, anti-piracy conventions and collaborative efforts are necessarily constrained to the activities at sea. While international cooperation and regulations may be prescribed, and will be discussed later, there is no enforcement mechanism by which states can coerce others into abiding by those regulations.
Failing and Failed States
Failing states, those defined by the Failed States Index as “vulnerable to collapse” are understandably more sensitive to issues of state sovereignty than others may be. These states may act in a manner such that the international community continues to perceive them as being capable of projecting their power both domestically and abroad. In fact, the Failed States Index the definition of a failed state is one in which the state has lost physical control of its territory[7].
Using that definition in the context of piracy, one can easily see why states like Indonesia might be reluctant to accept assistance from foreign powers in dealing with the domestic components of piracy. Using the Malacca Straits and the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol as an example, one could likely have predicted the reluctance to accept foreign assistance by simply looking at the failed states index. Indonesia has a “failure” index score of 83.1 while Malaysia scored a 69.2. Both of these states fail solidly into the “warning” category and both are resistant to taking on a great deal of direct foreign assistance in fighting piracy in their littoral waters. Contrast that with Singapore, a state that has been more willing to accept such assistance. Singapore scores a 160 on the Index, which places it almost in the “sustainable” category[8].
Adam Young also concludes that weak states often exacerbate conditions that may lead to piracy. According to Young, “ these problems are in part created, and exacerbated, by weak state control of political hegemony, i.e. the means of a state’s legitimacy: the monopolistic control over violence within defined territorial borders. Numerous gaps in this control have allowed piracy the operational space to re-emerge…[9]”
The Gulf of Aden provides ample illustration of how failing and failed states have allowed piracy to take root and flourish. Somalia is a failed state. In fact, it ranks at number one on the Failed States Index. Its governmental organs are non-existent. There is no recognized law, nor is there any means to enforce that law if it did exist. Somali pirates often claim to be members of the Somali Navy or Coast Guard enforcing fishing rights in the region. Since no actual Somali Navy or Coast Guard exists, there is no one to prevent such acts from occurring. One might suggest then that regional collective security arrangements might be beneficial in taking on the problem of piracy. An examination of the surrounding states, however, once demonstrates why collective security arrangements would fail.
Dijbouti, Somalia’s neighbor to the north, is considered a “failing” state. Yemen, the state directly across the Gulf of Aden is a “failed state.” Eritrea, the Sudan, Ethiopia – all of these states bordering either Somalia or the Gulf of Aden itself top the list of Failed States. They have little or no means of enforcing laws within their own borders, let alone attempting to work together to stem the tide of Somali pirates.
The Fall of the Soviet Union
The fall of the Soviet Union provides another illustration of the ways in which the failure of a state can have impacts on a global scale. Despite the ever-present tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War served to establish and maintain a balance of power throughout the world. As the two countries divided the world and fought wars by proxy, the support of the two powers served to contain large-scale aggression.
Several authors cite the end of the Cold War as a factor in the rise of piracy. “The proliferation of small arms among transnational criminal syndicates since the end of the Cold War who are now able to take advantage of a huge array of sophisticated weaponry left over from past wars in Afghanistan and Cambodia as well as from the former Red Army…[10]” is just one example of the widespread impact of Russia’s fall from power.
When the Cold War ended, it created a power vacuum – a uni-polar world that is too large for one power police, but in which no other power has been able fill the void. The United States, understandably, projects its power into those places that hold the most strategic importance. To date, piracy has not been a strategic concern of the United States, but has most affected those countries that were on the fringes of the power struggle between the two superpowers.”
[1] Chalk, Peter. (2008)The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and Challenges for the United States. Rand Corporation. P. 15
[2] Sakhuja, Vijay. (2007) “Sea Piracy in South Asia,” Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism. ed. Peter Lehr. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; New York, NY. Pp.33-34.
[3] Claude, Inis L. Jr. (1962) Power and International Relations. Random House; New York, NY. Pp. 196-204
[4] Raymond, Catherine Zara and Morrien, Arthur. (2009) “Security in the Maritime Domain and Its Evolution Since 9/11,” Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security. CRC Press; London. Pp. 3-11
[5] ANTARA News. (July 14, 2010) “Seven Countries to Discuss Malacca Strait Security.” http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/news/2010/07/news040.htm
[6] O’Meara, Richard M. (2007) Maritime Piracy in the 21st Century:
[7] The Fund for Peace. (2010) “Failed States Index 2010.” http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=891#4
[8] It should be noted that Singapore falls between France and the United Kingdom in the Failed States Index’ rankings within the “moderate” category. The United States and Japan are also in the same category.
[9] Young, Adam. (2007) Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Singapore. P.99
[10] Ong-Webb, Graham Gerard. (2007) “Piracy in Maritime Asia,” Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism. ed. Peter Lehr. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; New York, NY. P.79
Italian Tanker Hijacked off Oman December 28, 2011
Posted by Chris Mark in Industry News, Piracy & Maritime Security.Tags: Chris Mark, gulf of aden, maritime piracy, Maritime Security, mark consulting group, Oman, Piracy & Maritime Security, Somalia
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An Italian tanker carrying caustic soda was hijacked early Tuesday near Oman. The ship was carrying 18 people including 6 Italians, 5 Ukrainians, and 7 Indians. The ship, which wasn’t named, is owned by Manarvi.