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The Misleading Nature of Military Death Rates May 26, 2026

Posted by Chris Mark in Uncategorized, War, weapons and tactics.
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Someone on Memorial day posted on social media that submariners suffered the highest death rate of any American service in World War II. As a comat veteran who holds Memorial Day as a somber occasion it caused me to pause and think. While the raw stats suggest that the statement is true, is also very nearly meaningless as a statement about danger — and understanding why is one of the most useful lessons in how a single, accurate number can completely mislead you.

The American submarine force was small. Roughly 16,000 men made war patrols, and about 3,500 of them never came home, with 52 boats lost. That works out to a fatality rate near 22 percent — the highest of any U.S. branch. Historian Donald Miller, in Masters of the Air, makes the point bluntly: of all the branches of the American armed forces, only submarine crews had a higher fatality rate than his bomber boys, at almost 23 percent.

Now set that against the Eighth Air Force, which lost about 26,000 men killed — more fatalities than the entire United States Marine Corps. In raw numbers, the bomber campaign looks far deadlier than the silent service. Both pictures are accurate. They simply measure different things, and neither one, by itself, tells you how dangerous it was to actually do the job.

Rate Versus Count

The first trap is confusing a rate with a count. “Highest death rate” is a proportion: deaths divided by everyone who held the role. “Most deaths” is a raw tally. A small, lethal specialty can top the rate chart while contributing a tiny share of total deaths, simply because its denominator is small. That is exactly the submarine service — a few thousand deaths out of a few thousand men produces a brutal percentage.

The bomber force generates the opposite illusion. The 26,000 dead is a frightening number, but 350,000 men served in the Eighth Air Force, and most of them were ground crew and support staff who were never in danger. Measured against the 210,000 who actually flew combat, the death rate was about 12.4 percent. Measured against everyone in uniform, it falls to around 7 percent. The raw body count reflects the size of the force, not the danger of the seat.

So once we strip out the size disparity and compare combat men to combat men, the submariner — at roughly 22 to 23 percent — was in the statistically deadlier billet, and the bomber crews, at about 12 percent, come second. If a death rate were the same thing as danger, we could stop here.

It isn’t.

Danger Lives in the Exposure, Not the Total

A death rate is a cumulative number — the odds you eventually died, summed over your entire time in the role. What it conceals is the variable that actually defines danger: how much risk you absorbed per unit of exposure, and how much exposure you were forced to take. Epidemiologists separate these as cumulative incidence (did you die at all) versus the hazard rate (how lethal each moment was). War tells the same story.

A bomber crew’s exposure was tightly capped. A tour was 25 missions early in the war, later raised to 30 and then 35. Each mission ran about six to nine hours; the famous Memphis Belle logged 148 hours across her 25 missions, under six hours apiece. Complete the longest tour and you had spent, at most, around 245 hours in the air — roughly ten days of cumulative flying. That cap is the entire reason the cumulative death rate looks “only” moderate. Per hour aloft, the danger was savage. In the brutal 1942–43 period, of the men who flew the original 25-mission tour, only about a third survived it; by October 1943, fewer than one in four crewmen could realistically expect to finish. The job didn’t become survivable until escort fighters won air superiority — by 1945, 81 percent completed a full 35-mission tour.

A submariner, by contrast, accumulated his 22 percent over an enormous span of time. A single war patrol lasted six to eight weeks — a thousand hours or more continuously inside the kill zone — and most men made several. So while the submariner’s lifetime odds were worse, the bomber crewman faced a far higher chance of death per hour of combat, by something on the order of five to ten times. The two jobs were lethal in opposite shapes: the submarine was a long, grinding exposure; the bomber was a short, concentrated burst of extreme danger, repeated until your luck or the war ran out.

This is the heart of the matter. A short tour with a horrific per-mission hazard and a long tour with a milder per-hour hazard can land on the very same headline death rate. The number hides which one you were.

Figure 1. Approximate death rate per hour of combat exposure. The submarine held the worse lifetime odds, but a bomber crewman faced roughly eight times the risk per hour in the air.

MACV-SOG: The Law of Small Numbers at Its Deadliest

If you want the purest illustration of how exposure and small denominators distort a death rate, look at the most dangerous billet of the modern era: the covert reconnaissance teams of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG).

During the Vietnam war SOG teams ran cross-border missions into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam in tiny “spike teams” — typically two or three Americans led by a “One-Zero” plus a handful of indigenous troops. Its recon men posted a casualty rate that exceeded 100 percent, described as the highest sustained American loss rate since the Civil War. In 1968, every SOG recon man was wounded at least once, and about half were killed.

Two statistical points make SOG essential to this discussion. First, the denominator was minuscule — of roughly 2,000 men who served in SOG, only about 400 to 600 actually ran recon and direct-action missions. This is the law of small numbers: tiny populations produce extreme, volatile rates that large forces never show. A rate above 100 percent is impossible for a big army and routine for a few hundred men hit repeatedly. Second, that 100-plus percent is a casualty rate — killed plus wounded — and it tops 100 only because individual men were wounded multiple times. Apply the same discipline we used on the bombers and the death rate among recon men sits closer to half in the worst years. The categories matter, and conflating “casualty” with “killed” is how the number gets abused.

SOG also fits the bomber pattern in a way worth naming: it was all-volunteer, and its danger was delivered in a relatively small number of discrete missions, each lasting only days, rather than spread thin across a long deployment. The lethality was per-mission, and per-mission it was off the charts. (The flip side of that intensity: SOG recorded a kill ratio of 158 to 1 in 1970, the highest in U.S. military history.)

Easy Company: When Replacements Hide the Body Count

The final distortion is the one most people miss, and the Band of Brothers company illustrates it perfectly. E Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, jumped into Normandy, Holland, and Bastogne. It was formed at Camp Toccoa with about 140 men. By the end of the war, 366 men had served in its ranks, and 49 were killed in action.

Run the naive math and you get a death rate around 13 percent — comparable to bomber aircrew, and apparently far less dangerous than the submarine service. That number is a lie of the denominator. The company’s standing strength was only about 140, yet 366 men cycled through it. Easy was effectively destroyed and rebuilt more than twice over. It jumped into Market Garden with 154 men and came out with 98; it had already taken 65 casualties in Normandy. Counted against the men who were actually present at any given moment, the company suffered well over 100 percent casualties. The 13 percent figure is diluted because the denominator kept refilling with fresh replacements who hadn’t yet been hit.

Notice, too, that almost no Easy Company men became prisoners — like the submariners, their losses converted into killed and wounded rather than capture. A downed bomber crewman could parachute and survive as a POW; an infantryman in a Bastogne foxhole or a submariner in a sinking boat had no such exit. The shape of the casualties is as informative as the count.

So How Do You Actually Measure Danger?

A headline death rate flattens at least three distinct things into one misleading figure: the intensity of each exposure (per mission, per hour), the duration of exposure (how long, how many times you went out), and the denominator (small units and replacement churn that warp the percentage). The submarine looks worst by lifetime odds. The bomber looks worst per hour of combat. SOG looks worst per mission and shows how small numbers break the scale entirely. Easy Company shows how a steady stream of replacements can bury the true cost inside a tame-looking percentage.

Figure 2. The four headline death rates as commonly cited. Each is measured on a different basis — a peak year versus the whole war, a small recon subset versus everyone who served, and a figure diluted by constant replacements. Lined up as equals, they invite exactly the false conclusions this article warns against.

The honest question was never “what fraction of them died.” It is “how likely was a man to die each time he went out, and how many times was he made to go.” Answer those two, and the statistic finally tells the truth. Quote only the first number, and you can prove almost anything — including that the deadliest jobs of the war weren’t very dangerous at all. On Memorial day, remember those who gave all for our freedoms. Whether they were killed in combat or died in training. They all served and died for us.

References

  1. Miller, Donald L. Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany. Simon & Schuster, 2006. (Eighth Air Force fatalities; submarine fatality comparison; tour-completion statistics.)
  2. 398th Bomb Group Memorial Association, “One in Twenty — The 398th’s Killed in Action.” (12.38 percent mortality among 210,000 combat aircrew; tour-survival rates by year.) https://www.398th.org/History/KIA/index.html
  3. Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. Wound Ballistics in World War II, Chapter 9 — Eighth Air Force battle-casualty survey. (MIA resolution: roughly 40 percent killed, 60 percent survived as POW, wounded, or evaders.) https://achh.army.mil/history/book-wwii-woundblstcs-chapter9/
  4. Plaster, John L. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster, 1997. (Recon casualty rates; team structure; cross-border operations.)
  5. HistoryNet, “How Top-Secret Commando Unit SOG Took on the Most Dangerous Missions in Vietnam.” (Casualty rate exceeding 100 percent; 1968 figures; 158-to-1 kill ratio.) https://www.historynet.com/studies-and-observations-group-vietnam/
  6. The National Interest, “Inside the Daring Missions of MACV-SOG.” (Approximately 2,000 served in SOG; 400–600 ran recon and direct action.)
  7. Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest. Simon & Schuster, 1992. (Market Garden strength figures; Normandy and Bastogne casualties.)
  8. TogetherWeServed, “Famous Army Unit: Easy Company, 506th Infantry Regiment.” (140 original members; 366 total served; 49 killed in action.)

Note: Figures for elite and small units, especially SOG, are frequently dramatized. Where casualty rates exceed 100 percent, that figure reflects killed plus wounded (with multiple woundings per man), not a death rate. Comparisons above use matched combat populations wherever possible.

Tim Walz: Stolen Valor and the Dishonesty of Claiming Combat Service August 10, 2024

Posted by Chris Mark in Uncategorized.
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EDIT(I have so little respect for this dummy I had his name as TOM). it is TIM…like…little Timmy the coward….

Recently, the Harris campaign attempted to assuage concerns over Tom Walz’ lying about his service by saying he simply “misspoke”. For those who are not veterans I feel it is appropriate to give some context to his lies. First, “Turn Tail Tom” claims, through the Harris campaign that: “Governor Walz would never insult or undermine any American’s service to this country —” Yet, through his lies he has done exactly this.

Before I go on let me be clear. EVERY veteran who has served our great nation is to be applauded regardless of the job. That $100 million jet does not fly without a technician fixing the computer system. As a former Scout Sniper, if there was not an armorer to keep my rifle in match condition, my job was degraded. While we all like to make jokes, there is a truism in the quote: “Bullets don’t fly without supply”.

Within the veteran community there are three basic groups. Those who have been in direct combat (Combat veterans), those who have served in Combat zones but NOT seen direct combat, and those who are in support roles who have not deployed (in the rear with the gear). For every ‘front line’ or ‘combat’ troop there are about 10 support personnel in the US Military. Only about 10% of the Army, Marines etc. actually are doing the fighting. This is NOT to denigrate those who provide the support rather to show how important those jobs are to the war effort.

Every veteran knows that to be a combat veteran is considered the pinnacle of respect. It is so pronounced in the USMC that the MarineTimes actually wrote an article in 2015 about the infighting called No CAR,No Respect detailing how, within the Marine Corps, those who had earned the Combat Action Ribbon were perceived to look down upon those who had not seen direct combat. In short, Tom Walz did NOT misspeak about having been a war veteran. He intentionally lied about having been in ‘war’. The question is why? We know why. He wanted the respect and cache that comes from putting oneself in harm’s way.

Being a combat veteran is so revered within the military services that each service has specialized medals, ribbons or badges that enable one to immediately identify whether a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine is a combat veteran. In the USMC and US Navy we are issued a Combat Action Ribbon (CAR). In the Army they are issued either a Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) or the Combat Action Badge (CAB) and so on for each service.

Tom is a progressive liberal who hates guns. That is fine. By stating his ‘credentials’ (avid hunter (sure he is), war veteran), he is demonstrating his authority on the subject. This is a logical fallacy called appeal to authority. Tom Walz, in a public statement advocating for stricter gun control measures, asserted,

“We can make sure that those weapons of war, that I carried in war, is the only place where those weapons are at.”

This statement was intended to bolster his argument for restricting civilian access to certain firearms by drawing on his purported personal experience in a combat setting. By claiming firsthand knowledge of the destructive power of military-grade weapons, Walz aimed to position himself as an authoritative voice on the issue, suggesting that his experience granted him a unique and legitimate perspective on the dangers of such firearms in civilian hands.

However, it was later revealed that Walz had never served in a combat role, casting serious doubt on the authenticity of his claims. This revelation not only called into question Walz’s integrity but also highlighted the problematic nature of using appeals to authority based on false or exaggerated credentials in policy debates.

I have investigated numerous stolen valor claims and have reported a number of people on the claims. The vast majority of stolen valor claims are for people who simply want to impress a person of the opposite sex. In some cases it becomes more sinister such as in Tom Walz case where he is using the claims of combat earned by few to attempt to demonstrate authority on a subject in which he has no authority.

Shame on the Harris campaign for attempting to divert attention away from Tom Walz’ fraudulent claims of valor. In their defense, the Harris campaign stated: “In making the case for why weapons of war should never be on our streets or in our classrooms, the Governor misspoke. He did handle weapons of war Well, I supposes that makes him a combat veteran. I like fast cars. I have a fast car. I drive a Maserati. Based upon that, I suppose I can tell people I raced in the Monaco Grand Prix and am a race car driver? No, of course not. My ‘handling’ a fast car (BTW…it is NOT a race car any more than the AR 15 Tom is trying to ban is a weapon of war) does not make me a ‘race car driver’ any more than Tom is a war veteran.

He has stolen valor and should apologize personally for his shameful actions.

Chinese Cyber Attacks and Unrestricted Warfare February 1, 2024

Posted by Chris Mark in Uncategorized.
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I first wrote about this phenomenon in 2012. It is becoming reality. The recent cyber-attacks attributed to the Chinese government on American infrastructure can be analyzed within the conceptual framework of “unrestricted warfare,” a doctrine developed by two PLA Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in response to the perceived military superiority of the United States. This doctrine signifies a strategic shift from traditional, kinetic warfare to a multifaceted approach incorporating a broad spectrum of tactics including economic, political, and PR maneuvers to conduct ‘sub wars’ and ‘pseudo wars’.

At the core of unrestricted warfare is the recognition that the principles of war have evolved. As the authors state, “If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,’ but rather are ‘using all means including armed force and non-armed force, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests’”[1]. This perspective broadens the scope of warfare to encompass non-traditional methods such as economic manipulation, cyber-attacks, and disinformation campaigns, transcending the conventional battlefield.

The Chinese cyber-attacks on the U.S. infrastructure, as reported in the aforementioned sources, align with this doctrine. These attacks represent a strategic choice to exploit vulnerabilities in critical systems to cause disruption and potential societal panic, without resorting to open military confrontation. This approach fits into the broader pattern of asymmetric threats.

Asymmetric threats, characterized by a disparity in the means and methods between different adversaries, are further defined by three criteria: the involvement of a tactic that one adversary could and would use against another, the unique ability or willingness of the adversary to use such means, and the potential for serious consequences if these means are not countered. In the cybersecurity realm, these threats take on a significant role. A minor actor with basic hacking tools can compel major entities to invest heavily in defense, illustrating the asymmetry in resources and efforts between attackers and defenders.

The Chinese strategy, as evidenced by the cyber-attacks, meets these criteria of asymmetric warfare. It involves tactics that the Chinese government is capable and willing to employ, which the U.S. would not mirror. The potential consequences of these attacks are severe, necessitating significant defensive measures.

Further aligning with the principles of unrestricted warfare, the authors note that unconventional methods can be formidable weapons in modern conflict. They observe, “As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons”[2]. This recognition of non-traditional tactics as weapons underscores the expanded battlefield that now includes economic, political, and technological realms.

In conclusion, the Chinese cyber-attacks on U.S. infrastructure, as part of their broader strategic approach, are indicative of the principles of unrestricted warfare. They represent a calculated move to use asymmetric tactics to undermine U.S. strengths and exploit vulnerabilities, extending the battlefield into the cyber realm. This strategy exemplifies a modern approach to warfare, where the lines between military and non-military means are blurred, and the battleground extends into multiple domains.

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References:

  1. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Unrestricted Warfare.”
  2. Ibid.

Covid19: “The War God’s Face Has Become Indistinct” – China’s Unlimited Warfare Strategy April 14, 2020

Posted by Chris Mark in cybersecurity, Risk & Risk Management, terrorism.
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CT2013UPDATE-  Today (April 15, 2020) Fox News published an article supporting what has been proposed in this post.  Titled“Sources believe coronavirus originated in Wuhan lab as part of China’s efforts to compete with US the article lays out compelling evidence that China was attempting demonstrate that China’s “…efforts to identify and combat viruses are equal too or greater than capabilities of the United States.” The article states that evidence comes from classified, and open source sources and documents.  It further states that:

“…(China) blaming the wet market was an effort by China to deflect blame from the laboratory, along with China’s propaganda efforts targetting the US and Italy.”

For those who have not read Unrestricted Warfare referenced in this post, I would strongly suggest you consider reading.  The Fox News article is directly in line with China’s 1999 strategy of unlimited warfare against the US and European countries.

In 2013, I wrote an article for The Counter Terrorist  Magazine that identified the Chinese strategy of CyberWarfare. You can read the article here.

This followed a seperate article I wrote for the same magazine called “CyberEspionage” that identified China’s efforts to infiltrate the US.  Both identify the Chinese focus on unlimited warfare discussed below.ctmay2012

Today, while reading the news, I came across an article that stated that stated that the US State Department cables (read CIA and Intelligence) has stated that the Covid19 Virus may have originated the Wuhan Viral Lab (WVL) who were testing the Coronavirus in bats.  According to the Washington Post:

“As many have pointed out, there is no evidence that the virus now plaguing the world was engineered; scientists largely agree it came from animals. But that is not the same as saying it didn’t come from the lab, which spent years testing bat coronaviruses in animals, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California at Berkeley.”

No “Evidence” is distinctly different than “They did not do it”.  Keep in mind that in February, 2020, the US Government charged 4 Chinese Military members with the 2017 Equifax breach.

The question should be: “why would the Chinese launch viruses (if they did) and why would they hack US companies?”  The answer is actually pretty straightforward.   If you read the article from 2012, you will get much more information than in this blog post.

In 1990 the US engaged the Iraqi military in the Gulf War.  The Russians (then Soviets) tankmedinaand Chinese watched closely as the US went literally “toe to toe” with the World’s 5th largest standing Army (Iraqi).  96 hours later, the Iraqi Army was soundly defeated.  In particular was the Battle of Medina Ridge (also called the Battle of 73 Easting) fought on Feb 27, 1991. It was an absolute route. This convinced the Chinese that a “linear/kinetic war” with the US was unwinnable.

For this reason they embarked upon a new policy called “Unlimited/Unrestricted warfare”.

This is documented in the book called Unrestricted Warfare.  In first reading the document, I was shocked at what it contained.  In 1999, two Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels were tasked to write a document titled: Unrestricted Warfare that outlines China’s approach to war with the West.   In short, the document articulates a new definition of warfare that includes using all economic, political, and PR means to fight ‘sub wars’ and ‘pseudo wars’.

While we sit in the US laboring under our definition of warfare, our adversaries are redefining the battlespace.  Here are some quotes from the document:

“If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means including armed force and non-armed force, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”[i]

“As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.”[i]

In short, the Chinese manipulating currency, or the press or even paying a Harvard Professor to be an agent can arguably be considered a ‘pseudo war’ consistent with their strategy of unlimited warfare.  As more information becomes available, I would not be surprised to see that this is much more than an “accident” in a lab in Wuhan.  Look at the financial toll it has taken on the World and positions the Chinese to be much larger players.


[i] House of Representatives. (Kindle Locations 325-327). Kindle Edition.

 


[i] Wiangsui Qiao Liang and Wang. Unrestricted warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House; 1999.

A Perspective on Guns & Killing from “A Marine and his Rifle” (Updated 2020) February 25, 2020

Posted by Chris Mark in Uncategorized.
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SMallPir

“I left the sky in the middle of the night
I hit the deck and I’m ready to fight.
Colt .45 and Kabar by my side
These are the tools that make men die.”

-Infantry Cadence

With the recent political debates raging and ‘gun control’ once again front and center of the Democrat candidate’s platforms, I felt it was appropriate to update and republish for 2020.   This post is not a position on gun control rather it is intended give some insight into a side of the issue few outside of specialized jobs probably recognize or acknowledge.  That of the human weapon. (more…)